The August Offensive - Lone Pine, Suvla Bay, Sari Bair, The Nek and Hill 60 - Gallipoli (World War 1, 6 August 1915 to 12 August 1915)

About This Campaign

The August Battles - Lone Pine,  Suvla Bay, Sari Bair and The Nek

By late summer of 1915, the Allies were faced with a dilemma.  They had to break out of their narrow beach heads at Helles (British) and ANZAC if they were to have any chance of achieving the primary aim of the campaign;  the neutralisation of the Ottoman defences at the Narrows.

It was all about the 'vital ground' - and the Ottomans had it. As long as the Ottomans had the high ground, particularly at Chunuk Bair, an Allied advance to the Narrows would be untenable.  In the hills to the south of the Suvla Plain and north of ANZAC, Ottoman artillery positions could fire from a flank into the ANZAC positions, their fire directed by observers on the heights around Chunuk Bair.

The plan called for another large amphibious landing north of ANZAC at Suvla Bay, using the newly formed IX Corps under Lieutenant General Frederick Stopford, who although a General, had never commanded troops in combat.  His force originally comprised three Divisions of fresh (but inexperienced 'New Army') British troops, the aim of which was to clear and seize the high ground around the Suvla Plain. Elements of his 13th Division were detached under command of the New Zealand Australia (Anzac) Division.

The main effort would comprise a reinforced New Zealand Australia Division commanded by General Godley, comprising the New Zealand Brigade, the NZ Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Australian 4th Brigade,  the 29th Indian (Gurkha) Brigade, additional British troops from the 13th Division and the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades ( the former to hold ground in the 'Old ANZAC' positions and the latter to support the NZ Brigade). 

These forces would be split into a series of bodies that would strike out by night into the rough and broken ground north-east of ANZAC up two key ridgelines and then were to attack Chunuk Bair, Q Hills and Hill 971 simultaneously.  Finally, a supporting attack by the 3rd Light Horse Brigade across the Nek and onto the key feature of 'Baby 700' was intended to complement a NZ attack down the ridge line from Chunuk Bair.

Complex moves by large formations at night in very difficult terrain, requiring synchronisation and coordination (without modern communications) and with many of the enemy positions masked from the Allied naval gunfire support ticks just about every box in the 'things not to do' list of the tactics handbook.

This was all to be preceded by diversionary attacks at Cape Helles by the British 29th Dvision and at ANZAC by the 1st Australian Division onto a terrain feature that had once been defined by a 'lonesome pine" . 

The end-state would see the Allies positioned for a drive on Maidos (modern Eceabat) to isolate the Ottoman defences around the Narrows.



Lone Pine

The fight for Lone Pine was intended as a ‘demonstration’ to mask the true intent of the Allies' August Offensive with the aim of holding Turkish forces in the vicinity of Lone Pine while the main effort focussed on securing the Sari Bair range.  Without Sari Bair the Allies could not contemplate the thrust they needed across the Peninsula aimed at breaking the deadlock that had defined the battlefield since late May 1915.

What was supposed to be a significant demonstration,  the battle for Lone Pine, became, next to the landing, the largest and most significant single action fought at Gallipoli by the AIF.

The 1st Division was tasked with the Lone Pine mission.  The 3rd Brigade from the ‘outer States' of Queensland, South and Western Australia and Tasmania had led the Division ashore at the Landing in April, so it was placed in Reserve.  The 1st Brigade from NSW, which had been the Reserve at the Landing, was placed at the point with the honour of ‘leading the charge’ at Lone Pine.  The Victorians of the 2nd Brigade would be the second echelon of the assault, the same role they had fulfilled at the Landing.


So, on the 6th of August the men of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions began their battle procedure and moved into position.  They wore white calico armbands and patches on the backs of their tunics so they could be easily identified by observers in the rear and thus avoid being shelled by their own guns and naval gunfire support.

The First Division was deployed such that the 2nd and 3rd Brigades held the left and right flanks respectively while the 1st Brigade attacked in the centre with three Battalions forward and one (the 1st Battalion) as the Brigade Reserve. 

Artillery and naval gunfire preparation began in the late afternoon.  At 5.30pm, it stopped and the three forward battalions  hit the Turkish positions immediately the barrage was lifted, having moved forward in saps or trenches thrown out towards the Ottoman positions.  The Reserve, the 1st Battalion, was quickly drawn into to the fight.

They confronted well prepared positions with overhead cover.  Some men broke through the roof of the tenches while others ran on into communcations trenches behind.  The detail from the AWM diorama below illustrates the situation better than any description can.


Despite a continuous stream of casualties, the Australians quickly captured the forward trenches with the element of surprise in their favour, as they had so quickly made the ground while the Ottomans were still recovering from the effects of the preparatory naval and  artillery fire.  Troops racing to the rear had got to the rim of a depression known as "The Cup" but from there, the Ottomans quickly regrouped and began the ferocious counter attacking and bombing that characterised the rest of the battle.  

Blocking positions or 'stops' were erected in the trenches and furious bomb fights erupted.  Attempts at going over the top of the trenches were savagely engaged with machine gun fire from opposing sides.  The ANZACs had only improvised 'jam tim' bombs to counter the Turkish hand grenades.  Death was around every corner, and the intensity of the fighting unremitting.

The trenches quickly filled with the dead and dying of both sides.  Some of the accompanying images illustrate the conditions in which the men fought and died over the following days.  Casualty evacuation was a nightmare and decomposing dead lined the rims and floors of the trenches.  

Eventually, with the 2nd Brigade having been committed to the fight as well, the position was secured by the 10th August in what was to become the only victory in a string of failures.  The battlefield looked like a slaughterhouse; the cost had been appalling.

Most ominously, the Ottomans, particularly Mustafa Kemal, had realised that Lone Pine was not the main game and although fighting furiously to recover lost ground, they did not divert forces heading for the high ground.


Suvla Bay - On the 6th of August, at 10 pm, the British 11th Division landed at three separate beaches, in synchronisation with operations at Anzac. These were A beach on the southern side of Cape Suvla and B and C beaches, to the north and south of Cape Nibrunisi respectively. The landings at B and C beaches met with no resistance, but those in the boats heading for A Beach took steady fire from Turks entrenched on Lala Baba Knoll. The Manchester Regiment of the British 34th Brigade managed to land on A Beach and immediately took the offensive, driving the enemy north along the coast. However, by that stage dawn broke and the Turks, utilising the little artillery they had available, began shelling the entire area.

On the morning of the 7th of August, additional British troops came ashore. The Lancashire Regiment pushed forward in good spirits but advances were limited. As Hamilton later said, there was no leader present “to take hold of these two brigades, the 32nd and 34th, and launch them in a concerted and cohesive attack.”  This lack of leadership meant that, when the British 10th Division landed, its men became confused and mixed togethers, much like the men of the covering force did for the original Anzac landing on 25 April.

The Turkish reserves were stationed at Bulair on the Asiatic coast and unable to reach the area for at least 24 hours. Despite this, after a night and day of fighting the Suvla force had not taken even one of the important heights overlooking the Suvla Plain. The Suvla Force commander, General Stopford, was still aboard the Jonquil and he failed to take the initiative. Many of his senior officers suffered from the same inertia. When, finally, Hamilton personally intervened the preparations took far too long and the Turkish reinforcements had arrived at Teke Tepe. This meant the opportunity had been lost to make life exceedingly difficult for the Turks, who were fighting so desperately to hold back the assaulting columns around the heights of Chunuk Bair. The dream of reaching the Narrows was now just that: a dream.


Sari Bair - The attack on the Sari Bair Range was the lynch-pin of the entire plan.  It would secure ANZAC from Turkish observation and fire and dominate the eastern approaches.   However the plan was overly complex with a night approach through dreadful terrain, to an overly ambitious time-table. 

The Lone Pine attack had drawn Turkish reinforcements but the Turks realised it was a feint and the reinforcements kept going north and reinforced the Sari Bair range when the threat there was manifest.  They stopped the New Zealand assault force which was waiting for a lost battalion.  The Kiwis were unable to regain the inititiative despite the success of the Wellington Battalion in capturing the summit.

The 6th Gurkhas briefly captured Chunuk Bair but were forced off by misdirected fire from Allied warships. 

Monash's 4th Brigade had been ignominiously lost in a tangle of steep ravines and razorback ridgelines and sustained heavy casualties when caught in the open by well sited Turkish machine guns.  

An attack by the 3rd Light Horse Brigade at the Nek, which was supposed to have been supported by a complimentary attack by the New Zealanders as pre-requisite, was persisted with despite the New Zealanders not being able to mount their attack.  The 3rd Light Horse Brigade was infamously  decimated for no worthwhile purpose.

Relieving British troops who held the shoulders of the range were swept away in a ferocious Turkish counter attack.

The only modest 'upside' was that ANZAC was able to link up with the Suvla force, although the latter had failed to make any significant mark on the campaign.


The Nek - See this link for a detailed account (/research/home-page-archives/seven-silent-minutes-at-the-Nek)


Hill 60 - See this link to a detailed account of this battle (/research/home-page-archives/hill-60-gallipoli)



Steve Larkins 14 August 2015; additional material by Robert Kearney 2019

Composite map using Google Maps and graphics by Steve Larkins




The Last to Leave - Leon Gellert 10th Battalion soldier poet

The Last To Leave

The guns were silent, and the silent hills
had bowed their grasses to a gentle breeze
I gazed upon the vales and on the rills,
And whispered, "What of these?' and "What of these?
These long forgotten dead with sunken graves,
Some crossless, with unwritten memories
Their only mourners are the moaning waves,
Their only minstrels are the singing trees
And thus I mused and sorrowed wistfully

I watched the place where they had scaled the height,
The height whereon they bled so bitterly
Throughout each day and through each blistered night
I sat there long, and listened - all things listened too
I heard the epics of a thousand trees,
A thousand waves I heard; and then I knew
The waves were very old, the trees were wise:
The dead would be remembered evermore-
The valiant dead that gazed upon the skies,
And slept in great battalions by the shore.

For more information use this link:


Suvla Lone Pine and Sari Bair - the Aftermath

By late August it was evident to all that the Gallipoli August Offensive had been a very costly failure. Time was running out for General Stopford, whose Suvla operation never really got going and failed to capitalise on the brief window of opportunity when they had overwhelming local superiority of numbers.

Time was also running out for the Theatre commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton. His superiors had committed significant resources, they wanted results, and there was little to show for all of that apart from overflowing hospitals from Lemnos to London via Malta and Alexandria. Critical reports were being received in London from a number of journalists, including Ashmead Bartlett and Australian Keith Murdoch.

The British attacks at Helles had met with the same fate of all that had preceded them.

The New Zealand Australia Division’s attempt to take the Vital Ground of the campaign, the Sari Bair range, had similarly failed although it had come tantalisingly close when the New Zealanders of the Wellington Regiment under Malone and 6th Ghurkas had each held the heights briefly.

The Australian 4th Brigade under then Colonel Monash had ignominiously failed to make any impression on the operation having become lost on the approach to the objective and one of their Battalions having taken heavy casualties from well-sited Ottoman machine guns.

The Australian 8th and 10th Light Horse Regiments had been thrown away at the Nek, largely though a failure of local command. Only the Reserve regiment the South Australian 9th Light Horse had been spared, although they lost their Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Miel on the periphery of the charge.

The Sari Bair relief column, comprised largely of elements of the British 13th Division, had been ruthlessly swept off the Sari Bair heights in a ferocious Ottoman counter-attack on the 10th August.

Only the 1st Australian Division at Lone Pine had achieved local success, but at horrendous cost. It had not achieved its principal aim of distracting the Ottomans for reinforcing and holding Sari Bair.

Importantly, nothing had changed strategically. Neither side had the superiority of numbers required to carry off a major attack on defended positions. This ‘mathematactical’ dilemma had characterised the campaign from the outset. It was an established principle that an attacking force needed to outnumber the defenders by a ratio of at least 3:1 to have much chance of success.

Much of the firepower of the Royal Navy was masked by the terrain and Armour Piercing shot was a lot less effective than the shrapnel shells of the field artillery, so it was not the combat multiplier that had been hoped for. In effect it had barely compensated for the Allied paucity of effective artillery.

One last throw of the dice was then conceived. It was to be at a place called Hill 60.

The remnants of the 4th Brigade, who had fared poorly during their attempt to take Hill 971 on Sari Bair, would be joined by what was left of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade. This time the 9th Light Horse Regiment, with a new Commanding Officer, would play a more prominent role, its sister Regiments having been rendered largely ‘hors de combat’ after their losses at the Nek. The 10th Light Horse was however to figure prominently towards the end of the fighting at Hill 60.

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Showing 8 people of interest from campaign

CUNNINGHAM, Andrew Twynam

Service number 359
4th Light Horse Brigade Machine Gun Squadron
Born 12 Sep 1891

FRASER, Robert William

Service number 1141
10th Infantry Battalion
Born 12 Sep 1893

BETHUNE, Alexander Douglas

Service number 234A
8th Light Horse Regiment
Born 16 Aug 1879

ANDERSON, Walter Hugh

Service number 1903
Lance Corporal
4th Infantry Battalion
Born Jan 1886

MATHESON, Ernest Charles

Service number 722
9th Light Horse Regiment
Born Feb 1892

LANG, William

Service number 898
8th Light Horse Regiment
Born 1891

CARPENTER, Alfred Ernest

Service number 59
8th Light Horse Regiment
Born 1888

SHORT, Arthur Gawler

Service number 1744
16th Infantry Battalion (WW1)
Born Jun 1886

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