{"html":"  \u003cdiv class=\"timeline-details-images\"\u003e\n      \u003cdiv class=\"timeline-details-image js-timeline-anchor timeline-anchor \"\n        style=\"background-image: url(https://digitize-vwma.s3.amazonaws.com/I/images/37929/photo/zoom_e00439.jpg)\"\u003e\n      \u003c/div\u003e\n      \u003cdiv class=\"timeline-details-image js-timeline-anchor timeline-anchor hidden\"\n        style=\"background-image: url(https://digitize-vwma.s3.amazonaws.com/I/images/128473/photo/zoom_e00600.jpg)\"\u003e\n      \u003c/div\u003e\n      \u003cdiv class=\"timeline-details-image js-timeline-anchor timeline-anchor hidden\"\n        style=\"background-image: url(https://digitize-vwma.s3.amazonaws.com/I/images/5707/photo/zoom_Bullecourt_church.jpg)\"\u003e\n      \u003c/div\u003e\n      \u003cdiv class=\"timeline-details-image js-timeline-anchor timeline-anchor hidden\"\n        style=\"background-image: url(https://digitize-vwma.s3.amazonaws.com/I/images/5706/photo/zoom_Bullecourt_Hat.jpg)\"\u003e\n      \u003c/div\u003e\n      \u003cdiv class=\"timeline-details-image js-timeline-anchor timeline-anchor hidden\"\n        style=\"background-image: url(https://digitize-vwma.s3.amazonaws.com/I/images/5705/photo/zoom_Bullecourt_Digger.jpg)\"\u003e\n      \u003c/div\u003e\n      \u003cdiv class=\"timeline-details-image js-timeline-anchor timeline-anchor hidden\"\n        style=\"background-image: url(https://digitize-vwma.s3.amazonaws.com/I/images/43874/photo/zoom_Bullecourt_Cross.jpg)\"\u003e\n      \u003c/div\u003e\n  \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"timeline-details-description with-image\"\u003e\n  \u003ch4 class=\"js-timeline-anchor timeline-anchor\"\u003eBullecourt (First)\u003c/h4\u003e\n  \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1st Bullecourt - 11 April 1917\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\"Bullecourt, more than any other battle, shook the confidence of Australian soldiers in the capacity of the British command; the errors, especially on April 10th and 11th, were obvious to almost anyone.\"  \u003c/strong\u003e C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australian in the War of 1914-18, Vol IV\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBritish and Commonwealth forces mounted a major offensive around the city of Arras in April 1917, as part of a wider strategy to support a major French offensive in the south.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Australian Fourth Division, which included the  48th, 50th and 52nd  Battalions, all with large numbers of South Australians in their ranks,  was committed to an attack near the town of Bullecourt, one of a number of fortified villages in the vicinity that formed part of the German Hindenburg line of defences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cimg src=\"//s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/rslvwm/comfy/cms/files/files/000/001/056/original/ORBAT_1st_Bullecourt.jpg\" alt=\"ORBAT 1st Biullecourt\" width=\"504\" height=\"406\"\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not for nothing that so many street names in Australia bear this name.  First and Second Bullecourt together were among the bloodiest campaigns in which Australian forces were engaged in France.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first phase of the attack on the 11th April, became one of the debacles of Australian efforts on the Western Front.  The attacking troops assembled during the night, to be snowed upon while they waited for H Hour.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eNew tanks which were intended to support the attack and breach the daunting palisades of barbed wire, failed to meet even the lowest expectations.  Most did not even make it to the start line due to mechanical failure.  The rest were quickly put out of action.   This was to leave a lasting negative impression on the Australians of the utility of these new technical innovations that was not overcome for another fifteen months. \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTroops from the 4th and 12th Brigades managed to break into the German line but as so often happened, the resulting salient was hemmed in on three sides by the Germans.  Supporting artillery fire for the Australians was withheld because of uncertainty as to how far they had breached the German line.  In due course they were forced out with more than 1100 Australians being cut off and taken prisoner, the greatest number in any single engagement of the war.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eKilled in the attack was one of the AIF's most highly decorated officers at that time, Major Percy Black, DSO DCM of the 16th Battalion, killed by machine gun fire on the barbed wire in front of the German positions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eBullecourt typified the worst of Australian experiences on the Western Front, according to renowned South Australian historian Dr Bill Gammage: \"\u003cem\u003e1917 was the year in which machines and mud crushed remorselessly the highest endeavours and the most noble aspirations (of the Allies)\"\u003c/em\u003e ; and thus it was at Bullecourt\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHow the Battle came about\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe intent was to hold the Germans in place so they could not reinforce further south – where the French were mounting the Nivelle offensive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was further to protect the right flank of the British 3rd Army as it attacked further north in the Arras to Cambrai area as part of the Arras Offensive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGeneral Gough, the 5th Army commander (included 1 Anzac Corps) wanted to be in on the success achieved by his two fellow army commanders to the north – Allenby (3rd Army) and Horne (1st Army) and to be able to send the cavalry through the breach to exploit the open ground beyond (the unrealised dream of all of the cavalry commanders on the Western Front).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWhat Preceded the Battle:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGerman Operation ‘Albericht’ – withdrawal to the Siegfried Stellung or Hindenberg Line. This was a complex line of defences consisting of deep dug outs and concrete emplacements (block houses and pillboxes) protected by deep belts of barbed wire. The obstacles channelled the attacker into pre – determined killing zones  which could be swept by artillery and machine gun fire from the defender's dugouts and concrete emplacements.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eTwo main lines existed: OG (Old German) 1 and OG2.  The Germans made extensive use of reverse slope positions (ie behind the crest of a hill or rise meaning the defenders could not be engaged with direct fire)  and machine guns firing in enfilade (from the side of anyone trying to attack the position so as to fire though the attackers formation) and along the belts of wire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Allied forces follow-up of the Germans to the Hindenberg Line was known as the “Outpost Villages “battles. \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Australians, leading out of Bapaume, followed the Germans through the villages of Vaulx – Vraucourt, Morchies, Baumetz, Lagnicourt, Moeuvres, Noreuil, Doignies, Louverval, Boursies and Hermies (the outpost villages).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeanwhile the Canadian Corps conducted a successful attack on the line at Vimy Ridge to the north; the first major defeat of the Germans.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGeneral Gough was warned in the planning stage (which commenced on April 5) by Brigadier Brudenell White Chief of Staff 1 Anzac Corps that it would take eight days to cut the wire and he didn’t have sufficient artillery or time to do it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGeneral Gough was convinced by a junior officer of the Tank Corps (MAJ Watson) that the belts of wire could be broken down and flattened by the new wonder weapon – the tank – \u003cstrong\u003ewithout the need for an artillery bombardment.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGeneral Gough was a British cavalry officer and eager to make his mark as a successful commander as quickly as possible. The planning for this attack was rushed and not thought through in detail. He decided on the use of tanks for the attack the next day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e12 tanks from No.11 Company, ‘D’ Battalion, Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corps (security pseudonym for what was to become the Tank Corps) were tasked to lead the attack in front of the Australians and 62 (UK) Division.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEnemy Troops\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cem\u003e(at the start of the battle)\u003c/em\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eArmy – commanded by Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eXIV Reserve Corps (Gruppe Queant) with 27\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e (Wurttemberg) Division in this sector.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIts 120\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e Infantry Regiment (120IR) was in Bullecourt, 124IR was across the Australian line of assault and 123IR was around Queant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePositioning of Allied Forces\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom north to south:  62 (UK) Division (V (UK) Corps) / 4 (Aus) Division / 1 (Aus) Division (1 Anzac Corps).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe 1 Anzac Corps plan was for 4th (Aus) Division to attack with 12th Brigade (46 and 48 Battalions leading)  and 4 Brigade (14 and 16 Battalions leading, 13 and 15 Battalions in support) – across the ground on the right of the Central Road, breach OG1 and 2 and then move on to take Riencourt. 62 (UK) Division would be on the Australians’ left flank and would attack Bullecourt village itself then move on to attack Hendecourt. \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tiny-mce-underline\"\u003eFirst Bullecourt 10 – 12 Apr 1917\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe battle was characterised by rushed and incomplete planning\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe tanks, which were to have cut the wire (without the need of artillery) did not arrive on time. There had been a poor practical appreciation of their use and speed. They were held up by snow and poor visibility.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt was discovered that the German barbed wire was intact  – Discovered and reported by Capt Albert Jacka VC MC Intelligence Officer of 14 Battalion. He found the Sunken Road near the railway embankment and captured a small German patrol. He went back and warned his commanders of the need for artillery fire to cut the wire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe assembly for the attack began in freezing cold conditions, snowing.  The attacking lines of soldiers lay out in the snow in their assault formation near the Sunken Road waiting for the tanks.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe attack was eventually postponed until same time next day. Soldiers were exhausted and had to move back to their lines under fire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e“They straggled back like a crowd leaving a football match”\u003c/em\u003e – BRIG Elliott, Commander 15 Brigade. “Exhausted and dragging rifles along the ground by the sling. \u003cem\u003e“Of what use would I be to fight tonight”\u003c/em\u003e – Pte Galwey – 47 Battalion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGermans now knew that they were going to be assaulted. 4 (Aus) Division did not inform their neighbours - 62 (UK) Division -  that attack was postponed. They attacked Bullecourt village with an exposed right flank and suffered severe casualties.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eSecond assault on the 11\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e Apr – tanks again late and became targets as daylight approached. Murray and Jacka realised that the tanks wouldn’t reach the wire before German MG and artillery fire caused casualties among the infantry. Despite pleas up to the Army Commander they were told to attack and also that artillery support was denied.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first tanks to arrive fired on the 46th Battalion by mistake.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eAustralians breached the OG1 (cutting through the wire by hand!) and were heading for OG2 when the Australian artillery came down on them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCasualties were being caused by the German MG fire from the front and flanks, notably Bullecourt village. Sparks could be seen by the assaulting diggers as the bullets hit the barbed wire strands.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eGermans used field guns firing over open sights at point blank range and also ‘K’ or Kern armour piercing bullets to destroy the tanks.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy the afternoon of the 12th, Australian troops had to withdraw back to their own lines because of lack of artillery support.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e3300 casualties including 1170 captured as POWs.  This was the worst instance of Australian soldiers being captured en masse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tiny-mce-underline\"\u003eGerman Counter Attack at Lagnicourt 15 Apr 1917\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile the Australians were recovering, The Germans launched a counter attack against 1 (Aus) Division with 38 Division, 2nd Guards Reserve Division and 4th Ersatz Division.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThey assaulted from the direction of Riencourt and Queant reached the 1st and 2nd AFA (Australian Field Artillery) Brigades’ gun lines around Lagnicourt.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e2 AFA abandoned four batteries of guns after removing the breech blocks and dial sights.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe 5th Brigade launched a counter attack which drove the Germans out.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e1 AFA lost 5 guns to damage in the action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Australians were severely shaken.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eCAPT Newland, LT Pope and SGT Whittle were awarded VCs in this action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe detailed description from original work developed by an esteemed friend and colleague, the late Lieutenant Colonel Peter Morrissey, used with permission.  Steve Larkins September 2014.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n"}