Borneo - Operation Oboe July - August 1945
Map of Borneo. Source: Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series 1 (Army), Vol. VII, p. 453.
The Borneo Campaign, code-named OBOE, consisted of three operations; the taking of Tarakan, Labuan Island and Balikpapan. The “brainchild” of General Douglas MacArthur, in command of the South-West Pacific Area, later evaluations of OBOE attributed none of the advantages that MacArthur had claimed to the three operations.
Instead it has been suggested that the Australian government’s determination to take Borneo, against the express recommendations of General Blamey, was not merely to accede to MacArthur’s wish. Wheate and Gilbert have contended that the government’s decision may have been influenced by the perception that Borneo was an opportunity for Australia “to confirm its place at the table during later peace talks” by helping to defeat the Japanese.
At Tarakan, OBOE ONE was ostensibly aimed at the airfields that were of strategic interest. Nevertheless, there is little evidence they would have been able to prepare the airfields in time for operations at Brunei and Balikpapan and, in the end, the airfields were beyond repair. Australian losses were also considerable. While 1,540 Japanese were killed, 245 Australians were killed and 669 wounded.
At Labuan Island in Brunei Bay, the objective of OBOE SIX was resource-driven; to establish an advanced fleet base that could protect oil and rubber reserves in the bay. However, this would have little effect in the way of diminishing Japanese oil resources as they were already blocked by Allied operations, particularly the relentless and very effective US submarine campaign, to the north, which also greatly hampered Japanese re-supply by this late stage in the war. Australian casualties numbered 114 killed, 221 wounded with an estimated 1400 Japanese killed.
OBOE TWO, aimed at the capture of Borneo from Balikpapan was the final large-scale Allied operation of the war, and the largest amphibious assault ever mounted by Australian forces. Balikpapan had the advantage of “oil reserves, two suitable airfields, and a deep sheltered harbour.”
However the Australian Commander-in-Chief, Thomas A. Blamey, considered the operation to be “strategically unsound.” While the operation was successful, arguably due in no small part to the significant air and naval support, 229 Australians lost their lives with a further 634 wounded.
 Coates, John, “Borneo,” in The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, South Melbourne, Vic: Oxford University Press, 2008, 98.
 Wheate, Nial and Gilbert, Gregory, “Borneo, 1945 – An Amphibious Success Story,” Royal Australian Navy, viewed 04/04/2016, http://www.navy.gov.au/history/feature-histories/borneo-1945-amphibious-success-story.
 Coates, John, “Borneo,”98; 100.
 Ibid, 100.
 Ibid, 101.
 Ibid, 98.
 Ibid, 102
 Wheate, Nial and Gilbert, Gregory, “Borneo, 1945 – An Amphibious Success Story.”
 Coates, “Borneo,” 98.