Virtual
War Memorial
Australia

From In Search of Charles Albert Stokes DCM

The 11th April marks the beginning of the first battle of Bullecourt. The Germans had been retreating from the old battlefields surrounding Bapaume in early 1917 to their newly constructed defensive position known as the Hindenburg Line. This line had wire entanglements in front of the trenches that where very wide, in double belts of barb wire patterned with angles intended to cause advancing troops to be divided, gathering into these spaces that where covered by German machine gunners.

On the 9th April 1917 the British 3rd Army at Arras had success against the Germans defensive line, of the Allies great offensive planned for 1917. It was with this success that General Gough’s army was facing the Hindenburg Line at its southern flank ready to attack near the villages of Bullecourt and Riencourt. His orders were to breach the Hindenburg Line east of Bullecourt with the Australians on the 10th April 1917.

It was on the 8th April 1917 that General Gough was informed the artillery had failed to cut the wire entanglements in front of the German defensive lines sufficiently to allow the Australians to pass through to attack the trenches. Gough was advised to pose pone the attack to at least the 12th April 1917.

However it was a tank officer in command of twelve tanks attached to Gough’s Army, who suggested the idea for his tanks to break down the wire entanglements, once done would signal the infantry to advance through, capturing the trenches where a barrage from the artillery on German positions would protect the attacking infantry.

A senior tank commander went to Gough with this plan, Gough asked how soon this could be carried out, with the tank commander saying at dawn the next morning, which was to be the 10th April 1917.

Gough went to his headquarters informing General Birdwood and White of the plan with the tanks to break down the wire entanglements. There was doubts with this plan but Gough argued that the tanks would break the wire before the infantry was asked to attack. This tactic had been urged by tank commanders for their machines to be used in this way.

With the hastily drawn up plans for the attack, two Australian brigades the 4th and 12th were march forward to lay in the dark on the snow-covered fields far out from the protection of the railway embankment where the Australians had protection from the German Hindenburg Line that ran a defensive line past villages of Bullecourt and Riencourt.

General Gough was under the impression that the Germans were retiring from the Hindenburg Line where he ordered patrols to be sent out to test the strength of the line. It was found by these patrols the German line to be strongly held with its wire very formidable. Birdwood became aware of this telephoning Gough saying the operation was very hazardous. It was Gough who said the attack must take place. Even General White protested against the attack but was informed that all the more need to attack with zero hour to be 4.30am 10th April 1917.

However, the tanks did not arrive at that time and where still stuck behind the lines unable to meet the deadline for the attack. The two infantry brigades were withdrawn to the safety of the railway embankment. The British 62nd Division was apart of the attack, attacking Bullecourt who were not informed of the delay, suffered heavily from a German artillery bombardment, as did the Australians.

Gough told his Corp Commanders an attempt to get the tanks through and therefore the attack was to be repeated at 4.30am on the 11th April 1917. Strong protests from Birdwood and White were made to Gough, but he stated that the attack was urgently required.

The two brigades were once again moved forward on the morning of the 11th April, but the tanks where nowhere to be seen by 3am. By the time of the attack at 4.30am only 3 tanks had arrived, taking up position in front of 4th brigade on the right with 12th brigade on the left with no support from the tanks. The 12th brigade was attacking the wire entanglements head on. The infantry was now facing the situation of being without artillery to break the barb wire entanglement, as Birdwood and White had feared.

The infantry soon reached, passing the tanks who were still some distance from the wire, with the infantry getting through the wire into OG1 and OG2 trenches. By 7am of the attack, the tanks where destroyed on the battlefield, short of the barbwire entanglements. With the Australian infantry in the trenches the artillery was not allowed to fire. The Germans where on all sides of the Australians and by 8am the Australians where unable to receive supplies, reinforcements or messages. By 11.30am the Australians were beginning to fall back to their lines.

The 12th brigade on the left was been attacked by the Germans from Bullecourt in the trenches. The German defenders were bought to a standstill by the Australian 48th and 47th battalions in OG2. With continued fierce fighting the 48th retook the trench behind them, OG1 holding both trenches. It was at this time the artillery was allowed to fire under the impression that sections of the German lines had fallen. The artillery barrage was bought to bare upon the Australians who were in the German trenches.

By 12.30, the 47th and 48th battalion under heavy fire began picking up their wounded and coming back out through the wire retreating back to their lines.

It was in the 48th battalion ranks that Second Lieutenant Herbert James Hammond from South Australia, who had joined the A.I.F. in September 1915 at the age of 38 years. He had embarked from Adelaide in July 1916, arriving in France joining the 48th battalion in March 1917.

In was in the attack on the 11th April 1917 that Hammond was seen laying seriously wounded in a shell hole close to the first line of the barb wire entanglements. Witness account states they saw him laying in a shell hole, pressing on with the attack beyond where he was laying. Initially Lieutenant Hammond was report as missing, suspected a prisoner of war, but was later recorded as ‘killed in action”.

Sergeant William George Blaskett of Bowden, South Australia was promoted on 23rd February 1917 to the rank of Second Lieutenant with 48th battalion. He was killed in action at Bullecourt, aged 21. Witness accounts states he was killed by machine gun fire in the German trenches during the attack on 11th April 1917. He has no known grave.

Private Alfred William Oxman of Narrogin, Western Australia. A labourer prior to enlistment in November 1915 embarked from Fremantle in February 1916. Private Oxman was killed in action at Bullecourt, France on 11 April 1917. He was 24 years of age, with no known grave

From the first battle of Bullecourt in April 1917, the Australians had 3000 casualties killed or wounded.

With the first battle of Bullecourt the Australian Infantry had little faith in the capabilities of the slow-moving tanks that were hit or broke down leaving the Australians vulnerable. This mistrust of tanks was not finally overcome until their success in the Battle of Hamel more than a year later.

Charles Bean, Official Historian wrote;

'Bullecourt, more than any other battle, shook the confidence of Australian soldiers in the capacity of the British command; the errors, especially on April 10th and 11th, were obvious to almost everyone'.

I have walked the battlefield of Bullecourt on several occasions, it is not until you walk the fields locating the German positions near Bullecourt and Riencourt that you fully understand the magnitude of losses to the Australians.

Lieutenant Herbert Hammond, Blaskett and Private Oxman you have not been forgotten, along with all those other Australians who were lost at Bullecourt.

Lieutenant Herbert Hammond remains where later located near OG1 trenches. He is now buried in Queant Road Cemetery. The cemetery has a total of 2377 Commonwealth men buried, with 1441 unidentified.