Virtual
War Memorial
Australia

ANECDOTES FROM BERNIE McGURGAN

BACKGROUND
Born in Seymour, a Victorian Army garrison town, and raised on a dairy farm in central Victoria near a small town called Tatura, 15 clicks from the city of Shepparton, I was to go to school there until age 14. After completing secondary school in 1962 at Bendigo, a large Victoria country city, I joined the HQ office of the Victorian Forestry Commission, situated in Melbourne and became a base grade Victorian public servant. On 27 AUG 63 I enlisted into 91 Forestry Sqn, a Special Supplementary Reserve (SR) unit, different to normal CMF units, which conducted camps only once a year and which ideally suited my then life style.

Recruit training at Scrub Hill, Puckapunyal VIC, followed in mid 1963 and I was lucky enough to top the recruit course and earn the salubrious title of Super Sapper (Spr). I guess this whetted my appetite for things Army, particularly after doing the early 1964 CMF camp at Moorebank, NSW, the home of the School of Military Engineering (SME) and having ARA instructors teach us the intricacies of Bailey Bridge construction, demolitions, mine warfare, booby traps and field engineering.

Late 1963 I applied for OCS Portsea, Victoria, and after extensive testing and interviewing at Watsonia, was told politely to reapply the following year. Being a good soldier I did exactly that, however this time I was domiciled in Sydney, NSW, and had to endure once again the testing, medicals and interviewing at Eastern Command Personnel Depot (ECPD), Watson’s Bay on Sydney’s scenic South Head. One month later I received my call up notice and was told to report to Watson’s Bay on 8 JUL 65 to be indoctrinated, sworn in and moved to Victoria for the twelve month Offr Cadet course at OCS Portsea, VIC.

At OCS Portsea a hectic and hard twelve month training course ensured and on 10 Jun 66, I, along with fellow graduates from New Zealand, Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, New Guinea and TAS marched out of OCS as brand new 2 Lt, into our respective Army units and Corps. Being an ex-Spr I was allocated to the Royal Australian Engineers (RAE), given two weeks leave and told to report to my new unit, 24 Construction Sqn at Enoggera in QLD.


TRAINING AND PERSONAL MATTERS
After six months with 24 Construction Sqn, doing a Capt job on higher duties, and participating in the large military exercise Barra Winga at Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA), I was posted to the SME to complete the 11/67 Basic Offr Course, which lasted thirty five weeks. During JUN 67 I met a young, vivacious and very attractive Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps (RAANC) Offr, F 22980 Lt Leslie Margaret Smith (SVN 29 APR 70-01 MAY 71) aged 22, from Cooranbong in central NSW and originally from Ulverstone in TAS, who was a Nursing Offr serving with 2 Military Hospital based at Ingleburn, NSW. Lt Leslie Smith was destined to become my wife in DEC 71. Pl Commander duties at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion (1 RTB), Kapooka, NSW, followed and in APR 68 I was posted to 18 Field Sqn Townsville, QLD, as a Troop Commander. Detachment to the 35 Field Sqn followed in JUN 69 and in AUG 69 I received the letter from my OC informing me of my impending posting to SVN and the Team, as a temporary and very junior ARA Capt.

Whilst serving in 18 Field Sqn I made the acquaintance of Staff Sgt (SSgt) Brett Nolen (SVN 2 MAR 67-5 MAR 68) my Troop Sgt, whose expertise in the field of booby traps, mine warfare and field engineering was second to none. Brett Nolen was instrumental in establishing and developing the 1 Field Sqn Nui Dat mines room during 1967/68, at considerable personal risk to himself! His advice and knowledge on NVA/VC mines and booby trap tactics in this regard were to prove invaluable later on in SVN amongst the real thing. SSgt Brett Nolen was one of the better and more highly respected Senior NCO of the Engr Corps at that time! He was a font of knowledge in his chosen fields of booby traps, mine warfare and field engineering.

Whilst serving in Townsville I had drifted slightly apart from Lt Leslie Smith, who had gone to work at St Michael’s Hospital in Toronto, Canada, during late 1967. In 1968 I met a beautiful and quite charming young Townsville lass, also a nurse, by the name of Miss Rosemary Myers from North Ward in that fair northern city of Townsville. Rosemary Myers and I had become engaged to be married during SEP 69 and we planned to marry in APR 71 after my return from the Team in SVN.

TRAINING FOR VIETNAM
The first necessary specialist course to complete was the 18/69 Tropical Warfare (TW) Advisors Course at JTC, Canungra, QLD, conducted during the period 01 OCT 69-12 NOV 69. Although nearing the summer season, Canungra, situated on the Gold Coast hinterland some 60/70 clicks south of Brisbane, was cold at night and at times very warm during the daylight hours. JTC, the military name of Canungra during the inclusive years of 1954-1975, covers an area of 14,500 acres and has access to many other training areas along the QLD/NSW border and Gold Coast hinterland. All these extensive military training areas were lousy with leeches, flies, mosquitoes, ants, ticks, possums and many other human-biting type parasites!

JTC during the years 1966/72 was a hectic and very busy and important Army training establishment, training up to 10,000 soldiers each and every year in preparation for their Tours of Duty in SVN. All soldiers had to pass the Battle Efficiency (BE) course at JTC! JTC maintained a very high level of expertise in training Australian soldiers in all aspects of counter insurgency warfare, which had been learnt the hard way in places like Korea, Sabah, Malaya, Borneo and during the Indonesian confrontation of the early sixties.

Initially replacements for soldiers already serving in SVN, was done on a one for one as required basis. This method of replacement however was found to be too slow and too time consuming, as well as manpower intensive, and the system was changed to replacement on a unit for unit basis. This meant that a particular Australian Army unit was replaced by a sister Australian Army unit, as was indeed the case for our entire nine Australian infantry battalions, during our SVN involvement.

Later on again certain training for SVN replacements was conducted at Puckapunyal
(2 RTB) in VIC, and Singleton (3 RTB) in NSW, with staff supplied by JTC to ensure the correct military message was getting across to our future troops going to war. This was done on a needs basis, to cut down on travel and other associated costings, which would have eventuated from conducting all SVN pre-embarkation training at JTC in QLD.

Accommodation at JTC was very basic and the course students were housed in twelve foot by twelve foot World War II tentage with large flies, erected on Battle Ridge, the parallel ridge line to the main HQ buildings, Regt Aid Post (RAP), Dental and Mess complexes on Centre Ridge. The third parallel ridge Administration Ridge, housed all the administration units necessary to support all the training activities at JTC such as Transport, Workshops, Engineer, Catering, Military Police (MP) and other Pogo type support units.
Instructors –JTC 1969

The majority of students being experienced old and bold soldiers were to successfully complete the course and be posted to AATTV in SVN by late 1969 or early 1970. Those who did poorly were simply fronted to the Chief Instructor (CI), Lt Col Blue Hodgkinson (SVN 03 DEC 66-30 APR 67), who had previously served with the 5th Battalion the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), HQ Australia Forces Vietnam (AFV) and HQ 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF), and informed that they were to be marched out back to their home units, and were never seen again! Others were failed when they could not complete the water jump or physical requirements of the course or simply did not wish to continue and literally gave up on the course, as being too difficult at this stage in their military careers and life.

Within the ARA it takes time and experience and keeping one’s nose clean, to eventually gain rank whether it be Offr, WO or Senior NCO. The majority of the course had achieved the rank of senior Sgt or WO, and within the Offr element had achieved the rank of Lt to Maj. The average age was thus accordingly high and most of the course attendees were in the early thirties to late forties age group. Lt Jim Levens (SVN 11 Jan 67-30 JAN 68 &
23 DEC 70-11 NOV 71) who had served with A and B Squadron 3 Cavalary Regiment (A & B Sqn 3 Cav Regt) and HQ 1 ATF already, and myself, were the exceptions being the youngest on course at the grand old ages of twenty four and twenty five years of age respectively.

The course progressed to the confidence course stage and the dreaded water jump into the deep Song (River) Coomera. Maj Harry Lovelock (SVN 10 MAY 67-30 APR 68), the Senior Instructor (SI) for the course, made it a habit to be on the high tower platform where all and sundry had to jump off into the Song Coomera, in order to qualify in this individual water test. On this particular day one of the WO was being a little tardy, and hesitant in carrying out the required jump, and the good major said he would count to three when he then expected the WO to actually jump. He counted one, two and before calling three, stuck his shoulder into the startled WO, who went straight into the river, no problems, much to his surprise and utter shock!

Maj Harry Lovelock as an instructor, additionally had several other personal traits which endeared him to us, during our classroom instructional periods. Harry Lovelock was a large framed man around six foot tall, very fit at the time, a RMC Duntroon graduate, and sported a large black handle-bar moustache. During lectures he would stand at the front of the classroom and roll the inevitable Drum cigarette from the very recognizable blue plastic pouch, whilst lecturing at the same time. The end result was he would be lecturing, licking his cigarette paper and getting rid of excess tobacco strands from his roll-your-own cigarette, by spitting onto the lecture room floor, prior to lighting his durry, all at the same time.

It was certainly a sight to behold and remains firmly in my memory to this day! Above all, Harry Lovelock knew what he was talking about, as he had just returned from his stint with the Team in APR 68 wherein he had replaced Maj Peter Badcoe VC in Hue as Province G-3 Advisor, and Maj Ross Buchan as Senior Australian Advisor I Corps in Danang. He was also involved with the TET Offensive of 1968. In later years Harry Lovelock was to be posted second in command of 2RAR in Townsville, and other Senior Staff appointments in New Guinea and the Australian mainland. He was to retire with the rank of Lt Col and now plays a lot of golf and resides at Victoria Point in eastern Brisbane, QLD.

Another Engineer Officer instructor on the course was Capt Cam Spencer (SVN 06 MAY 68-21 MAY 69), who fortuitously was the second Team Officer to serve as Senior Advisor with the 1/51st ARVN Bn, the very same battalion I was about to also serve with in SVN! Cam Spencer has long ago retired from the Green Machine and now works for the Brisbane Airport Authority and resides in Brisbane, QLD.

A further fellow Engineer on staff was WO Steve Johnstone (SVN 01 JUN 65-30 APR 66), who was later to serve as the Sqn Sgt Major (SSM) of 18 Field Sqn in Townsville, a Sqn I am most familiar with. Sgt, later on Maj Frank Wolber (SVN 05 DEC 67-19 NOV 68), whom I was later to serve with in Brisbane and become life long mates with, worked in the Battle Wing orderly room as Chief Clerk, a very important man to be on the right side of in regard to administration and pay matters at JTC!

WO Terry Egan, DCM (SVN 26 SEP 67-10 SEP 68) who served with the 1st ARVN Division (1 ARVN Div) Reconnaisance (Recce) in Thua Thien Province and with Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) Regional Development (RD) training in Chuong Tien Province in the Delta was also on staff. WO Terry Egan had been heavily involved in the NVA Tet Offensive in Hue during 1968, and was most informative of life as an Advisor within an ARVN Div, just over 12 months prior. He had had a tough time from around Hue during this large NVA offensive, which largely decimated the NVA ranks and seriously jeopardised their ultimate military plans within SVN for many years to come.

Both WO Charles Emery (SVN 05 MAY 65-30 APR 66) who served with 2 /3rd ARVN Bn and 5 Special Forces (5 SF) Danang during 1965/66 and WO Terry Egan, managed to portray to us in no uncertain terms the experiences they had had in SVN during the years 1965-68, and it was certainly a quick learning lesson and eye opener to say the least! WO Terry Egan, who has now found God, is currently the Padre for the QLD branch of the AATTV Association and resides in Ipswich, QLD. WO Charles Emery currently resides in Brisbane and runs his own small transport company in that sunny and beautiful, river city in southern QLD.


NEWS OF MY POSTING
On 15 AUG 69 I received a personal letter from my Officer Commanding (OC), Maj Ray J Johnson (SVN 06 JAN 70-21 JAN 71) saying “on present planning you can expect to go to AATTV next MAR as a Temporary Captain”. I immediately thought, “What the hell have I got myself into this time?” Being a keen and ambitious young regular Army Officer, I had volunteered for SVN service, but was still very wary and somewhat in awe of future service with the Team! This was no doubt due to all the stories I had heard over the last seven years of the Team’s role, its activities, and above all its well reported casualty and injury rates.

I had been quite happily ensconced as second in command of 35 Field Squadron (35 Fd Sqn), a Citizen Military Force (CMF) Engineer Unit at Mt Isa, detached from 18 Fd Sqn Townsville my ARA parent unit for the period 17 JUN 69-01 DEC 69, when Maj Johnson’s letter hit me like a ton of bricks. I realized then that I would be required to attend at least three mandatory AATTV courses, to bring me up to military speed, prior to posting to SVN as an Advisor the following year, early 1970.

During the period 15 FEB 71-20 MAR 71 I took my annual recreation leave and pre-embarkation leave by again saying goodbye to Rosemary Myers in Townsville and driving to my home town and dairy farm at Tatura, VIC. My mother Gwen McGurgan, was now domicile in Bendigo some 96 clicks away to the west of Tatura, and I went there to deliver my trusty EH Holden Station Wagon to my younger sister Therese, who had commenced her nursing training in that fair city. After saying farewell to my mother, two sisters and brother I was duly moved to Benalla Railway Station on 20 MAR 70 and arrived at the SME, Moorebank, my holding unit prior to reporting to ECPD at Watsons Bay on 23 MAR 70. Whilst at SME I kept a very low profile and did not attempt to communicate with Lt Leslie Smith, who was still posted to 2 Mil Hosp Ingleburn just down the track, being an engaged and soon to be married young Offr and all! I did learn in later years however that Lt Leslie Margaret Smith had remained off duty and was readily available, in the 2 Mil Hosp Offr Mess on the nights 21/22/23 MAR 70, fully anticipating and expecting me to ring and make contact with her again! We were fortunately fated to re-kindle our relationship during a hectic 1970 in the war zone in SVN itself. Such is the way of events and life!

VIETNAM
Hill 55 “NUI DAT SON” –Home of US Army Advisory Team1 ( GR AT 970 620 )

Advisory Team 1 ( Postal address APO 96349, San Francisco, USA) was located on Hill 55 ( Nui Dat Son), trig point Duc Ky and GR AT 970 620 on SVN/US Army maps, and was situated in Dien Ban District of Quang Nam Province. It was located 12 clicks southwest of Danang City and Danang AFB. Following the usual USMC custom it was designated as Hill 55, as it was 55 meters above sea level on the US military maps of that area. In 1965 the USMC originally christened Hill 55 as Camp Muir, named after Lt Col Joseph E Muir, CO 3/3rd USMC Bn, who was KIA by an explosive device near Hill 55 on 10 SEP 65. The nomenclature never really caught on, and it faded into oblivion in favour of Hill 55. It was the highest ground formation or large hill in the southwest coming from Danang. To its west were the mountainous areas of Charlie Ridge and the flat valleys and high lands of Happy Valley together with the numerous large river systems, which began their descent from the high mountainous areas of western Quang Nam Province into the South China Sea just south of Hoi An in Hieu Nhon District.

Nickle Nickle had originally been the CP for elements of the 3rd Marine Div in 1965, the 9th Marine Regt (3rd Marine Div) in AUG 65 and later on the 7th Marine Regt (1st Marine Div) during 1968. The 7th Marine Regt was relocated to Que Son and were relieved on Hill 55 by the 1st Marine Regt (1st Marine Div) mid to late 1969. Sometime around late 1969 the 51st ARVN Regt, which was then located in the vicinity of Hoi An, moved to Hill 55 and established its Regt HQ on the Hill recently vacated by the 1st Marine Regt.

Due to the previous USMC occupation Hill 55 had extensive bunker systems, a high watch tower, sealed roads, large and small LZ areas, hard standing and solid ground defences, consisting of barbed wire entanglements and extensive mine fields, on all likely enemy approaches. Prior to the USMC the French had occupied the feature and it was virtually impossible to establish where their minefields finished and the USMC or ARVN minefields began. Suffice to say the surrounding minefields were quite deep in length and breadth and were very poorly maintained, due to the problems of not knowing exactly where each and every mine was located in the ground! As the good book tells us they were fully covered by direct fire weapons, from the MG emplacements in each ARVN Bn and USMC Arty Bty perimeter defensive area.

The Regt Senior Advisor now occupied the bunker previously occupied by the USMC Regt commander and it was quite a comfortable place to live and sleep in, whilst off duty. Situated deep underground it was very spacious, had a flush toilet, including a white enamel toilet bowl to sit on, the only one I ever saw outside of Saigon, Danang and 1 ALSG, and hot and cold running water to the shower and kitchen recess. There was room to conduct an Orders Gp (O Gp) at a large table and chairs, map wall and kitchen/cooking area to prepare meals and hot drinks or toddies if required. As it was deep underground it was safe from stray 122 mm rockets or 82 mm mortars which landed on Hill 55 from time to time. Additionally the Lt Col had a magnificent stereo and TV system set up in his quarters, which was a pleasure to sit back and listen to over a good malt whisky! More importantly the Regt Senior Advisor had given me permission to use his hootch and shower. This was extremely gratifying to the lone Australian Senior Advisor within the Regt, and put to good use at the completion of some drawn out and torrid operations in the field, where outer bodily cleanliness had a very low priority, and getting rid of grime and dirt back on the Hill was a top priority.

During my time on Hill 55 we were hit by NVA 122 mm rockets on four to five occasions and by 82 mm mortars on many more instances. These enemy weapons systems would normally have been targeted or intended for Danang and its sprawling AFB, some 12 clicks distant. They normally caused few casualities on Hill 55, were very noisy on detonation and were more of a nuisance/scare value than anything else. The hooch of the 1/51st ARVN Bn Advisors sleeping accommodation was badly holed several times by 122 mm rocket shrapnel, whilst I was on the Hill, but no one was wounded as all Advisors were busy in other areas of the Regt HQ and not gonking or resting up at the time.

Nickle Nickle was now fully occupied by the 51st ARVN Regt, a USMC Arty unit, the US Army Advisory Team 1 of which I was now a member, a Seabee Detachment (Det) and normal support type POGO troops assisting the ARVN Regt and the USMC troops located on the Hill. Lt Ron Acord, a USMC Offr, who was based in Danang was particularly helpful in regard to defensive stores such as sandbags, concertina wire, star pickets and timber required for refurbishment jobs around the Hill defensive bunkers and positions. He was a very handy man to know!

Support fire available from the Hill included a USMC Duster, which was stationed permanently on the Hill, a permanent and integral USMC Tow 155 mm Arty Bty reinforced, and extensive berm defences incorporating 106 mm RCL, 81 mm mortar firing pits and MG bunkers and towers. As well there were Bn transport compounds, individual Bn defensive locations with Bn CP and various strong points. The TOC and HQ element of the Regt was located within walking distance of the Advisory HQ. The Hill possessed a large chopper pad, capable of handling up to four to five CH-53 at a time for rapid Bn deployment, and a smaller LZ, adjacent to the ARVN Regt HQ, for VIP and Senior commander’s LOH and Huey choppers, who paid us visits from time to time!

OPERATIONS- AN OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITIES
On the morning of TUE 31 MAR 70 my ARVN Bn was airlifted by US Army Huey choppers to an AO some twenty clicks west of Hill 55, and within sight of Charlie Ridge to the north west, and the Song La Tho to the south. On our eastern front was the Song Yen, which at that particular point on the ground ran from the south to the north, with the Song La Tho running roughly from the west to the east. The Bn was tasked to sweep east and force any enemy units in the vicinity to withdraw also in that same direction and into a large two Bn blocking force dug in on the flat ground on the eastern expanses of the Song Yen, which as you moved further east commenced to flow in an easterly direction. The whole area was open type rice paddy fields with the locals living in small hamlets on the riverbanks, where the vegetation was heavier, and drinking water and shade were available.

Mid morning and we bumped into a small enemy unit holed up on the western side of the meandering Song Yen. To get me up to speed as quickly as possible, Wally Sheppard allowed me to control my first live Alley Cat chopper strike onto the enemy position. Alley Cats was the C/S or generic name given to gunships from the US Army 282 AHC (Assault Helicopter Coy) of the 212th Combat Support Aviation Bn at Danang. Black Cat was the generic name given to the resupply choppers from either 282 AHC or 213 ASHC (Assault Support Helicopter Coy) also based in Danang and from which seven Black Cats were allocated to Quang Da Special Zone daily! All US Army AHC in SVN worked on similar AHC organisations of gunship, troopship and resupply chopper Pl within the many US Army AHC and ASHC posted SVN in 1970.

I correctly marked our forward locations with smoke for the FAC and Alley Cat pilots, as JTC and Maj “Black Harry” Lovelock had taught me to do so well, and the location of our remaining Rifle Coy positions. All was going well until the lead Alley Cat pilot radioed that due to the time I had taken to correctly and precisely identify all locations, he would need to return to Danang and refuel! I felt very chastened and made a mental note not to be as pedantic next time, when I again had to put in an air to ground strike via the choppers. By the time the Alley Cats returned and expended their ordnance the enemy group had di di moued and left only one or two enemy soldiers behind who would initiate contact, and then disappear into the river side vegetation and their underground hides. We cleared the eastern banks of the Song Yen and went into a Bn harbour for the mid day meal and to prepare for a change of direction to the north during the remaining daylight hours of our advance.

This was my first experience using a FAC in I Corps and what a tremendous and valuable strike asset they are to any Infantry ground force and a wonderful machine of war!

(b)
As I was preparing my night area I had overheard Capt Wally Sheppard on the radio to Regt, C/S Oscar 1, organising a Black Cat re-supply and thought it rather strange as we had expended little ammunition, water, rations or hardly anything for that matter! Within 20 minutes a Black Cat appeared from the east, identified our purple “goofy grape” smoke popped by Sgt Willie Fuller, and quickly landed in our Bn HQ position.

The rear gunnies quickly began throwing what looked like damp sand bags out onto the deck and the chopper quickly departed. Capt Sheppard, Lt Boyer and a couple of Binh Si collected the six or seven sand bags and brought them to our position on the ground and began to open the bags. To my astonishment the re-supply turned out to be frozen beer cans, mixed with frozen American KC Cola, other non-alcholic drinks and some C Rations. The KC Cola went directly to the CO, the other lolly water to the RSM and Capt Wally Sheppard confiscated the beer and C rations for the Advisors.

As the frozen beer was either American Schlitz, Budweiser, Millers or Paps and quite low in alcohol content tasting like lolly water, we all partook of several cans, some more than others. They were beautiful and cold and a delight to drink after a hot afternoon in the sun prior to evening stand to, and going into our normal Bn night activities. I thought Wally Sheppard was taking the mickey out of me! However he had organised a freezer in our Team Advisors hut, and had instructed the US Army administration Sgt, Sgt Cain, in no uncertain terms exactly how to freeze the beer progressively and then get it to us in the field in various stages of de-thawing and ready to drink! War is hell at times!

Three days later and I had gotten pretty used to the running procedures of the Bn HQ and Rifle Coy and of the idiosyncrasies of the CO, Dai Uy Thanh. The CO ruled his Coy commanders with an iron hand, so much so that they would do little on their own initiative, without the CO having direct involvement or issuing explicit instructions or orders at his O Gp. My counterpart the CO, was thus held in awe, probably from fear by the majority of the Bn and its Offr ranks, but in most cases he used this power wisely, as one would after fighting wars for so long, as he undoubtedly had up until 1970.

As with most Bn CO of any Army, my CO had certain habits and dislikes which he was not backward in promoting. Dai Uy Thanh had a particular dislike of getting his feet wet and would go to extraordinary lengths to find quite shallow river crossings, even if it meant lengthy detours. That way his feet were dry and his boots nice and clean! This was to nearly lead to his downfall on the morning of 08 APR 70 when we changed our direction of advance to the north and were preparing to cross the Song Yen again, to our immediate northern front, and which was flowing in this area from west to east back towards the South China Sea coast.

The CO had found a shallow crossing and he and his HQ party were busy scrambling up the northern bank of the Song Yen prior to moving out again in a northerly direction. The ARVN FO party was immediately behind the CO with the Advisor group immediately behind them as we moved through the waters. The water was perhaps three to four feet deep as we moved across towards the northern bank, to link up with the CO and his group who by this stage were just disappearing over the rise of the northern river bank.

I had just began to climb the northern bank, which would have been about twenty to twenty five feet high from the rivers central fast flowing waters, and was half way up when there was a tremendous violent explosion. I was bodily picked up and thrown back into the middle of the river water, from my position on the bank! All I remember is a huge concussion blast, flying through the air, a very loud explosion and coming to my senses again back on the bank.

What had happened was the signaller for the ARVN FO party had dropped his AN-PRC 77 handset, and had been dragging it through the heavy vegetation, whilst moving forward at the same time. The handset had caught on a trip wire which was attached to a 105 mm artillery shell booby trap, a favourite trick of the local NVA/VC! The immediate detonation of the 105 mm shell was devastating with two ARVN killed outright and another three seriously wounded, all from our ARVN FO party.

The CO was fortunate in that he had just exited the top of the river bank and was moving down to the flat ground on the northern side when the artillery shell detonated, with the huge blast passing harmlessly well over his head, and above the soldiers to his immediate front and flanks.

I partially came to my senses upside down in three foot of running water, with Sgt Willie Fuller leaning over me, and physically dragging me back to the northern bank and out of harms way. I had lost my M-16 rifle which the ARVN later recovered, and except for the fact I could not hear at all for several weeks, and some superficial shrapnel wounds on my head, shoulders and arms, I was quite OK and hardly scratched at all. I was badly shaken up though at my close encounter with death! I could not say the same for the ARVN FO party who were completely wiped out! We regrouped and I made a mental note to travel even further back from the CO and his FO parties in future operations in the flat country where we were now in. Lt Mike Boyer notified Capt Wally Sheppard who was still on Hill 55, and he informed Maj Bob Aitken at AATTV HQ in Danang, that I had been wounded in action (WIA) by a booby trap, but remained on duty, via our noticas system.

It had been a very close shave but I had been lucky and lived to carry on. The ARVN found and returned my M-16 rifle, and I was later to verify through the new AATTV Adjt Capt John Hartley (SVN 08 MAY 66-12 MAY 67 & 23 APR 70-07 APR 71), that the M-16 rifle Registered Number 134 513, was indeed the original weapon signed out to me in Saigon and was the correct weapon I had picked up in Saigon on 25 MAR 70. Capt John Hartley had replaced Capt Dave Rowe as Team Adjt sometime during MAY 70.

The operation had been successful in that we had flushed out a number of small enemy units with an end of operation body count of twelve NVA/VC KIA with three ARVN KIA and a further eight ARVN WIA, but who would live to fight again. The CO conducted his debrief, awarded a couple of gongs for bravery to four ARVN soldiers, promoted several Bing Si to Ha Si Nhat and we started to get ready again for our next operation.


(c) As with most Bn CO of any Army, my CO had certain habits and dislikes which he was not backward in promoting. Dai Uy Thanh had a particular dislike of getting his feet wet and would go to extraordinary lengths to find quite shallow river crossings, even if it meant lengthy detours. That way his feet were dry and his boots nice and clean! This was to nearly lead to his downfall on the morning of 08 APR 70 when we changed our direction of advance to the north and were preparing to cross the Song Yen again, to our immediate northern front, and which was flowing in this area from west to east back towards the South China Sea coast.

The CO had found a shallow crossing and he and his HQ party were busy scrambling up the northern bank of the Song Yen prior to moving out again in a northerly direction. The ARVN FO party was immediately behind the CO with the Advisor group immediately behind them as we moved through the waters. The water was perhaps three to four feet deep as we moved across towards the northern bank, to link up with the CO and his group who by this stage were just disappearing over the rise of the northern river bank.

I had just began to climb the northern bank, which would have been about twenty to twenty five feet high from the rivers central fast flowing waters, and was half way up when there was a tremendous violent explosion. I was bodily picked up and thrown back into the middle of the river water, from my position on the bank! All I remember is a huge concussion blast, flying through the air, a very loud explosion and coming to my senses again back on the bank.

What had happened was the signaller for the ARVN FO party had dropped his AN-PRC 77 handset, and had been dragging it through the heavy vegetation, whilst moving forward at the same time. The handset had caught on a trip wire which was attached to a 105 mm artillery shell booby trap, a favourite trick of the local NVA/VC! The immediate detonation of the 105 mm shell was devastating with two ARVN killed outright and another three seriously wounded, all from our ARVN FO party.

The CO was fortunate in that he had just exited the top of the river bank and was moving down to the flat ground on the northern side when the artillery shell detonated, with the huge blast passing harmlessly well over his head, and above the soldiers to his immediate front and flanks.

I partially came to my senses upside down in three foot of running water, with Sgt Willie Fuller leaning over me, and physically dragging me back to the northern bank and out of harms way. I had lost my M-16 rifle which the ARVN later recovered, and except for the fact I could not hear at all for several weeks, and some superficial shrapnel wounds on my head, shoulders and arms, I was quite OK and hardly scratched at all. I was badly shaken up though at my close encounter with death! I could not say the same for the ARVN FO party who were completely wiped out! We regrouped and I made a mental note to travel even further back from the CO and his FO parties in future operations in the flat country where we were now in. Lt Mike Boyer notified Capt Wally Sheppard who was still on Hill 55, and he informed Maj Bob Aitken at AATTV HQ in Danang, that I had been wounded in action (WIA) by a booby trap, but remained on duty, via our noticas system.

It had been a very close shave but I had been lucky and lived to carry on. The ARVN found and returned my M-16 rifle, and I was later to verify through the new AATTV Adjt Capt John Hartley (SVN 08 MAY 66-12 MAY 67 & 23 APR 70-07 APR 71), that the M-16 rifle Registered Number 134 513, was indeed the original weapon signed out to me in Saigon and was the correct weapon I had picked up in Saigon on 25 MAR 70. Capt John Hartley had replaced Capt Dave Rowe as Team Adjt sometime during MAY 70.

Another quite noticable foible of the CO was that he neither smoked nor drank alcohol, at least not in my company or in the company of his soldiers. At all victory and promotion functions and ceremonies he drank KC Cola and never let a cigarette pass his lips, I guess both good habits in any one’s language. The last week of the operation, 08-13 MAR 70, was spent in continual rain and in chasing the elusive local enemy. The Bn moved further north and then east to an RV point north west of Hill 55, and on the morning of MON 13 MAR 70 we moved by Huey choppers back to the Regt HQ on Hill 55.

The operation had been successful in that we had flushed out a number of small enemy units with an end of operation body count of twelve NVA/VC KIA with three ARVN KIA and a further eight ARVN WIA, but who would live to fight again. The CO conducted his debrief, awarded a couple of gongs for bravery to four ARVN soldiers, promoted several Bing Si to Ha Si Nhat and we started to get ready again for our next operation.
with most Bn CO of any Army, my CO had certain habits and dislikes which he was not backward in promoting. Dai Uy Thanh had a particular dislike of getting his feet wet and would go to extraordinary lengths to find quite shallow river crossings, even if it meant lengthy detours. That way his feet were dry and his boots nice and clean! This was to nearly lead to his downfall on the morning of 08 APR 70 when we changed our direction of advance to the north and were preparing to cross the Song Yen again, to our immediate northern front, and which was flowing in this area from west to east back towards the South China Sea coast.

The CO had found a shallow crossing and he and his HQ party were busy scrambling up the northern bank of the Song Yen prior to moving out again in a northerly direction. The ARVN FO party was immediately behind the CO with the Advisor group immediately behind them as we moved through the waters. The water was perhaps three to four feet deep as we moved across towards the northern bank, to link up with the CO and his group who by this stage were just disappearing over the rise of the northern river bank.

I had just began to climb the northern bank, which would have been about twenty to twenty five feet high from the rivers central fast flowing waters, and was half way up when there was a tremendous violent explosion. I was bodily picked up and thrown back into the middle of the river water, from my position on the bank! All I remember is a huge concussion blast, flying through the air, a very loud explosion and coming to my senses again back on the bank.

What had happened was the signaller for the ARVN FO party had dropped his AN-PRC 77 handset, and had been dragging it through the heavy vegetation, whilst moving forward at the same time. The handset had caught on a trip wire which was attached to a 105 mm artillery shell booby trap, a favourite trick of the local NVA/VC! The immediate detonation of the 105 mm shell was devastating with two ARVN killed outright and another three seriously wounded, all from our ARVN FO party.

The CO was fortunate in that he had just exited the top of the river bank and was moving down to the flat ground on the northern side when the artillery shell detonated, with the huge blast passing harmlessly well over his head, and above the soldiers to his immediate front and flanks.

I partially came to my senses upside down in three foot of running water, with Sgt Willie Fuller leaning over me, and physically dragging me back to the northern bank and out of harms way. I had lost my M-16 rifle which the ARVN later recovered, and except for the fact I could not hear at all for several weeks, and some superficial shrapnel wounds on my head, shoulders and arms, I was quite OK and hardly scratched at all. I was badly shaken up though at my close encounter with death! I could not say the same for the ARVN FO party who were completely wiped out! We regrouped and I made a mental note to travel even further back from the CO and his FO parties in future operations in the flat country where we were now in. Lt Mike Boyer notified Capt Wally Sheppard who was still on Hill 55, and he informed Maj Bob Aitken at AATTV HQ in Danang, that I had been wounded in action (WIA) by a booby trap, but remained on duty, via our noticas system.

It had been a very close shave but I had been lucky and lived to carry on. The ARVN found and returned my M-16 rifle, and I was later to verify through the new AATTV Adjt Capt John Hartley (SVN 08 MAY 66-12 MAY 67 & 23 APR 70-07 APR 71), that the M-16 rifle Registered Number 134 513, was indeed the original weapon signed out to me in Saigon and was the correct weapon I had picked up in Saigon on 25 MAR 70. Capt John Hartley had replaced Capt Dave Rowe as Team Adjt sometime during MAY 70.

Another quite noticable foible of the CO was that he neither smoked nor drank alcohol, at least not in my company or in the company of his soldiers. At all victory and promotion functions and ceremonies he drank KC Cola and never let a cigarette pass his lips, I guess both good habits in any one’s language. The last week of the operation, 08-13 MAR 70, was spent in continual rain and in chasing the elusive local enemy. The Bn moved further north and then east to an RV point north west of Hill 55, and on the morning of MON 13 MAR 70 we moved by Huey choppers back to the Regt HQ on Hill 55.

The operation had been successful in that we had flushed out a number of small enemy units with an end of operation body count of twelve NVA/VC KIA with three ARVN KIA and a further eight ARVN WIA, but who would live to fight again. The CO conducted his debrief, awarded a couple of gongs for bravery to four ARVN soldiers, promoted several Bing Si to Ha Si Nhat and we started to get ready again for our next operation.

(d)
On the morning of THU 30 APR 70 WO Dave Dermody, myself and my ARVN driver motored the short distance north to Hill 55 and got ready for the O Gp. Lt Col Bacon had just finished bringing us up to date and we were all having coffee in the Advisors mess hall, which had a good view back to the south over the Song La Tho Bridge and river and the commencement of the north south road to Dodge City and beyond.
We were making idle conversation, and drinking coffee, when we all picked up the distant unmistakeable whump, thump of a large explosion, and saw immediately the tell-tale black and grey smoke plumage of a large detonation, somewhere back along the north south connecting road south of the Song La Tho. WO Dave Dermody, myself and an ARVN escort party immediately set off by foot back along the road to Dodge City, in the general direction of the explosion.
As we approached the scene of the detonation I spotted the remains of a USMC jeep which had been blown completely off the road, probably some twenty to twenty five meters, with only its engine block recognizable and the metal body frame completely blown away. The two USMC soldiers on board had been blown completely away and the ARVN search team only managed to find a Marine’s boot, with a portion of his ankle and sock still inside the boot. The rest of the Marine’s bodies had been blown completely to shreds and were unrecognizable, amongst all the blood and pieces of flesh, and were unrecoverable.
I reported all available information to Regt HQ and they advised a USMC chopper was on its way and would be on station within 5/10 mikes. The ARVN escort positioned themselves in all round defence around a cleared LZ site, and we awaited the arrival of the chopper on the eastern side of the road way, where the remains of the USMC jeep were. The Marines were obviously from Hill 55 but I could not ascertain whether they were from the USMC Arty unit there or part of the road security force for the Seabees.
At about this same time a further USMC ¾ ton truck with two Marines on board, was about to turn north onto the north south road from the T intersection and move to Hill 55. At almost the same time Trung Si Do, RSM of the 1/51st ARVN Bn and his escort party, were making the same trip from Dodge City, and had fallen in some 40/50 meters behind the USMC vehicle as it progressed north toward Hill 55. They were not in radio communication and apparently were unaware of the fate of the USMC jeep some 2 clicks ahead of them, on the north south road! We could see the two vehicles approaching rapidly but had no means of warning them of possible further mines on the road, between their location and ours.
The USMC ¾ ton truck was around sixty to seventy meters south of our location when there was another tremendous explosion, and the truck and its occupants were blown sky high into the paddy field, accompanied by another swiftly rising telltale black and grey coloured cloud . The RSM’s vehicle suffered heavy shrapnel damage from the blast to its immediate front and the RSM, peppered on the face, arms and legs with shrapnel, was bleeding profusely and muttering or crying in broken Vietnamese “Why me again, Why me again?”
We went through clearing and securing the immediate area of the second explosion, patched up the RSM and his driver as best we could, and attempted to find the remains of the Marines in the second vehicle. This time we were lucky and although the two Marines were KIA, the ARVN found dog tags, weapons and other identifying material on body remains. However, it was not a pretty sight!
It had been some 10 minutes since the two incidents and finally the USMC CH-46 appeared overhead. I instructed the pilot to land adjacent to the road on the eastern side, in an area we had previously secured and cleared with our ARVN soldiers. The pilot completely ignored my instructions and landed on the bloody north south road to our immediate south, between the two mine incident sites. Luckily there were no more devices planted on the road to our south and he landed successfully.
A large USMC Maj deplaned together with some twenty heavily armed Marines. I quickly gave him an update on what had occurred and after a further detailed search, for further remains of the now four USMC soldiers KIA, he decided to take the RSM and his driver direct to the USMC Hospital facility at Marble Mountain for further medical treatment.
After the CH-46 departed I spoke with Regt HQ and requested the Duster be sent down to escort our little ARVN and two Advisor detachment back to Dodge City by travelling through the scrub and paddy fields, parallel to the road and some fifty meters from it, to enable us to safely reach Bn HQ. They agreed and we sat down to await the arrival of the Duster. WO Dave Dermody had decided to move to Dodge City with us, to enable him to pick up his clobber and then hop a Huey back to Regt and his Bn, I thought this was a good idea at the time!
By now some forty minutes had gone and to my utter amazement we spotted a further US Army vehicle approaching from the direction of the T intersection, to the south. It was a Seabee bitumen tanker roughly the same size as a 21/2 ton truck, and it had gotten to within one hundred meters of our present location, when it too detonated a third large NVA/VC road mine on the North South road. It was thrown off the road by this third detonation, and into the paddy field on its side and caught fire instantly. We managed to drag the driver out, who was badly burnt, but we could do nothing further for his escort who had taken the brunt of the explosion on the right hand side of the tanker, and was killed instantly.
A USMC Huey arrived in minutes. We secured the area again as best we could, and the Huey landed in the Paddy Field within our little perimeter as instructed. We were having difficulty in getting the badly burnt Seabee on board, as due to his wounds he could not bend because his arms and legs had been bound in some sort of special bandages and splints to assist in the healing process, by the USMC Medic from the chopper. He walked like a Mummy, could not be lifted, and to enable him to enter the rear of the Huey one of the door gunnies got out, and kneeling on the ground made his body into a step to allow the Seabee to step on his back, and then into the back seat of the Huey. I had never seen this happen before, and it worked to perfection. Last seen the Dustoff was heading rapidly back to Danang to the north east with its badly burnt Seabee patient on board. I was to learn later the Seabee recovered from his burns and returned Stateside, for him the war in SVN was over!
WO Dave Dermody and I were a little taken aback by these three quickly occurring large mine explosions, what with 4 USMC KIA, 1 Seabee KIA, 1 Seabee seriously WIA (burnt) and the RSM and his driver WIA in three separate mine incidents. Particularly more so as we had driven over exactly the same piece of road earlier on in the morning! I guess it was not our time to meet our maker! Whilst still waiting for the Duster I radioed Regt and instructed my driver to get our jeep back to Dodge City the long way. This required him to drive back to the outskirts of Danang, and move back to Dodge City via Mieu Dong and Route 1 to the east, quite a detour from his normal route between Hill 55 and Dodge City.
The Duster duly arrived and we made our way successfully back to Dodge City by walking behind, and in the path made by its steel tracks. I informed the CO what had happened to the RSM and his driver and where they had been taken for further medical treatment. They actually returned to Dodge City the very next day, shaken from their experiences, but otherwise quite OK. WO Dave Dermody flew out by Huey late that afternoon and rejoined his Bn on Hill 55 without mishap.

(e)
Around 0700 HR next morning after a hearty breakfast, Frank Ramsey and I strolled to his waiting O-2 FAC parked ready to go in line with other similar aircraft belonging to 20th TASS. Frank had briefed me on the emergency jacket come safety vest we were both wearing, and ran me through the various emergency procedures from inside the aircraft. We seemed to be surrounded by communication gear immediately to the rear of the two single seats! The emergency exit was on my right hand side of the cockpit, and I could see two propellers front and rear of the cockpit and a section of a large tail boom to the rear of the aircraft. The two rocket pods containing the 2.75 in WP rockets were clearly visible and each rocket had a safety pin inserted with a small tell tale safety ribbon, wafting in the gentle early morning sea breeze from the South China Sea.
Frank carried out his pre-flight checks and started both engines. After a short warming up period he taxied to an arming area, where our rockets would be armed, and made ready to fire. Whilst stationary in this arming area, and with both our hands pressed against the front windows to signify to the three ground crew that nothing untoward would happen whilst the rockets were being armed, we awaited their action. The ground crew NCO moved quickly to the front of the aircraft and gave a thumbs up sign to signify all rockets were armed and we were cleared to take off. Frank Ramsey returned the NCO gesture, saluted and away we went onto the main Danang AFB runway.
On the move Frank explained that some serious accidents had occurred in the past, to ground staff who whilst busily arming the wing rockets, had the misfortune of idle cockpit staff accidentally hitting the fire button for the rockets, with catastrophic results to men and equipment on the ground. It was now SOP for all aboard to place their hands on the front windows, whilst being armed up by the ground crew prior to take off.
We were quickly airborne and Frank took us to 2500 ft and headed south west past Hill 55, to fly over Dodge City where my Bn was still employed on road security. Nearing Dodge City I quickly established communication with Lt Mike Boyer who, as we did a circuit of the compound below, came out into the middle of the compound with Sgt Willie Fuller and waved to us. He advised all was quiet on road security and we had had no contacts for the last 48 hours. They were shortly joined by the CO Capt Thanh, from his Bn CP, he also waved at us and had obviously been monitoring our conversations and came out to see his Senior Advisor flying overhead with the ARVN Bn FAC.
As things were very quiet and there was nothing of note for Frank to get exicited about, we headed further west to the AO of our two sister Bn of the 51st ARVN Regt operating in that area. We approached the area of Charlie Ridge and Happy Valley, whose place or code names were originally designated and given by the USMC, and were areas to the immediate west of Hill 55 and south west of the Danang AFB. We established communication with the Advisors of the 2/51st and 4/51st ARVN Bn and discovered the former was in contact with the NVA and required FAC assistance.
My two ARVN sister Bn had been advancing to contact within their separate AO when the second Bn had made contact and met heavy resistance from an estimated one or two NVA Reinforced Coy, dug in on a high feature on the southern approaches to Happy Valley. We spoke to the Bn Senior Advisor who briefed us on the situation, and located and sighted, on the ground and on the map, the exact positions and GR of all the Rifle Coy including the exact position of the Bn forward elements, in contact with the NVA.
We climbed to somewhere around 3000 feet in preparation for our WP strike whilst Frank Ramsey briefed the fighters, already circling above, on the target area. The F-4 Phantoms had been in a holding pattern for some three to four minutes and were eager to get on with the job due to fuel usage and TOT!
Frank put the small aircraft into a steep dive toward our target area, fired a WP rocket, and then went into a swift climb back to our original height hitting zero gravity at the top of the climb, my stomach was telling me so! Frank then advised there were spew-bags available in a side pocket if required. I thought to myself “ Yeah, thanks Frank” as I tried to quickly regain my composure! The Senior Advisor informed us we were on target and to put the Nape and Snake some 50/60 meters to the north of our WP strike.
Frank spoke to the lead jet jockey again and advised him to put his ordnance in as instructed by the Bn Senior Advisor. It is always best to lay down bombs and napalm across one’s frontal area, at right angles to the axis of advance, rather than have the jets fly over or fly toward your position whilst delivering their goodies. It is not always physically possible to do so of course, but limits the dangers of drop shorts if the jets deliver as described above, rather than the latter, much less preferred method. The same goes for Arty support, but again is very dependent on the Arty gunline positions, in relation to your position and the enemies position on the actual ground.
The Phantoms did a quick dummy run and orbited anti clockwise for their first actual line up and strike, based on high feature identification and bearings from the dummy run. They rolled in at low altitude, still moving fast, seemingly just above tree top height and brushing the top foliage, adjacent to where Frank had his FAC holding station and observing the jet strike.
Napalm ( Nape), hit very near the spot to the north of our smoke, confirmed by the ground force, and was quickly followed up by the 500/750 lb HE high drag bombs (Snake), into the same area. When the first sortie had expended all ordnance, another sortie of Phantoms quickly took over, and repeated the dosage and type of ordnance onto the enemy location, within a very short time frame.
Frank Ramsey, in common with all chopper pilots had the habit of writing on the inside of his cockpit window the C/S and frequency of all units he was supporting each day. This necessitated a good clean of the window each evening but the grease pencil staedtler refill pen markings, were easy to remove when the time came. All chopper pilots and FAC pilots that I operated with, ended up each evening with a myriad of C/S and associated jumble of frequencies of units they had worked with during the day, scribbled haphazardly over the bottom half of their cockpit windscreens. It was quite a sight to see and to be able to decipher on the go, and to get the correct frequency and C/S of the ground Infantry unit as required was something to behold! It needed much practice!
With the ear phones on the FAC pilot also had to be able to respond quickly to any communications that were pertinent to himself and the ground force he was at the time supporting. Superimposed on top of the tactical frequencies was AFVN playing songs like, We Gotta get out of This Place by the Animals, and other hits of the late sixties, early seventies. It took considerable FAC experience to be able to work with so many voices, both ground and air born, with rock music tuned to correct volumes, and to be able to respond accordingly from the cockpit of the O-2. A similar communication situation occurred in regard to all chopper support.
We remained on station whilst the Bn, some thirty minutes later, put in a deliberate attack and cleared the two knolls where the NVA had been dug in. Results were good in that some 10/12 NVA were KIA, with 1 ARVN KIA and 6 WIA on the actual assault. Frank Ramsey was happy and the Advisors reasonably so, from the late mornings work.
Flying further west Frank dropped the aircraft down to 1000-1500 feet whilst flying up a large valley running away to the north east. I was observing nonchalantly the ridge line under the starboard wing, through the upper perspex of my side door, when I noticed numerous strobe lights winking at us from the ridge line, and it was the middle of the day?
I told Frank of my sightings and he immediately went into a steep dive to port, gaining speed and putting as much distance as possible between us and the strobe lights I had just observed. He calmly advised me that what I had actually seen were enemy 12.7 mm HMG, firing at our unprotected aircraft. He went on further to explain that we would not realise we were being fired at, until one of the heavy 12.7 mm rounds actually hit the aircraft, and we would certainly know then! Some bloody consolation I thought to myself!

(f)
On FRI 29 MAY 70 the Bn was airlifted by USMC CH-53 choppers into a supposedly “cool” LZ to the north of Thuong Duc, a small town some 40 clicks to the west of Hill 55 in Thuong Duc District, the largest District in Quang Nam Province. The choppers were working in two groups of three and with some 40/60 Binh Si on each lift we were moving somewhere around 300 soldiers in six choppers. This meant the entire Bn, plus attachments and the Prisoner Coy, would be moved in three distinct sorties by the six choppers working non-stop sorties between Hill 55 and the LZ to the west.
Prior to taking off from the main Hill 55 chopper strip, the LZ in the Thuong Duc area had been heavily softened up by both Arty prepartory fire and Alley Cat gunships in the form of Hueys and Cobras. Not only was our actual LZ hit with preparatory fire but other high prominent features, with possible chopper LZ in the area, were also peppered with preparatory fire in an endeavor to disguise our true LZ destination and the eventual LZ of the 1/51st ARVN Bn and its attachments.
we prepared to put down on the lower 1210 meter feature on the eastern side of the high ground, which had a large LZ area and was still smoking, burning and smoldering, from the preparatory aerial bombardment from both aircraft and Arty. Time stood still as the CH-53 quickly landed and we rushed to get out the back ramp as quickly as possible. To no avail though as we began to receive mortar and HMG fire the moment the chopper’s wheels hit the deck, from the adjacent equally high ground to the north and north west of the LZ.
Our chopper departed straight up and the second CH-53 came in with the enemy incoming fire intensifying even further. We were quite unfortunate, or fortunate whichever way you looked at the situation, in that we had bumped a large NVA force on the move from our LZ position to similar high ground to the north. We made a “Group Three” Cpl decision, and quickly began to occupy the defensive positions and weapon pits abandoned by the retreating NVA unit. I guess they may have been somewhat shaken up by our preparatory bombardments of Arty and chopper fire and were a tad angry at our most recent incursion into one of their base positions!
Occupying the old NVA positions worked two ways however in that the NVA had the LZ zeroed in with their mortars, and knew only two well the exact locations of their old individual weapon and mortar pits. We had no choice and quickly found weapon pits to get away from the incessant mortar barrage. The Advisors found themselves in a large mortar firing pit which had been extensively prepared and quite roomy for the Advisors, with two weapon pits running off on opposite sides of the central mortar firing area.
The Bn CP was a further forty or so meters to our north west and in what was originally a large well prepared large NVA HQ position with the USMC FO party to our direct north, in a central position, some thirty meters in that direction. The rest of Bn HQ went to ground as they arrived and found refuge in similar weapon pits and bunkers, around the feature and the LZ itself.
We were actually deployed on the south west corner of the large LZ and sat and watched as the next three choppers arrived and spilled their loads of ARVN Binh Si quickly onto the ground. All wasted no time in getting under cover with the choppers coming and going in quick succession. The ARVN in one of the these later CH-53 were a little tardy in disembarking and the USMC pilot, due to the incessant mortar barrage and HMG fire still coming in, simply lifted the front of the chopper and the remaining ARVN on board tumbled and fell down the rear loading ramp! The last two sorties arrived within the hour and we now had the complete Bn on the ground surrounding the LZ and the top of the 1210 feature.
One Rifle Coy was quicky up and away to attack and occupy the higher 1235 meter feature to our immediate west, one Rifle Coy to a position in dead ground to the rear of Bn HQ and the remaining Rifle Coy to back up the western assault Coy. The attacking Rifle Coy had gone no further than two hundred meters when it came under heavy intense NVA fire and was forced to deploy.
The FAC was on station and I quickly arranged Nape and Snake onto feature 1235 and after numerous sorties of F-4 Phantoms, the last Coy onto the LZ moved around to the south in an attempt to take the feature from that direction. They too met heavy enemy resistance but managed to get to the top of the feature and secure it. They were immediately joined by the original ARVN Coy who had tried to take the very same feature from the east.
We now had two ARVN Rifle Coy on the higher 1235 feature with Bn HQ and the Prisoner Coy on the lower 1210 feature and the small saddle in between. The remaining Rifle Coy was in a reserve, reverse slope, position on the southern slope of the 1210 feature.

First Night ( 29 MAY 70 )
It was now late afternoon and the Bn went into its normal night routine. The NVA mortars and HMG fire had dwindled considerably and I thought they may have withdrawn further to the north and north west, this was not to be the case however as we were to find out in no uncertain terms. The USMC FO plotted and registered all DF the CO and I had decided upon and gave us a nickname for each and every DF GR, around the Bn and Rifle Coy positions. Lt Col Bacon was on secure green voice to me and advised there was the very high probability of a large NVA unit of at least Regt strength, from the latest Int report, in our immediate area! This was not good news for our lone ARVN Bn sitting on the two high features, in a known NVA base territory area.
Additionally we planned for TPQ bombing to hit the enemy occupied high ground and superimposed this extra firepower onto our already registered Arty DF targets. TPQ is radar controlled bombing usually at night, and is extremely accurate as long as your GR are accurate and your map reading is spot on! It is quite disconcerting to hear the scream of jet engines in the middle of the night, followed quickly by the whomp, whomp, whomp, of 500 to 750 lb HE bombs hitting their targets to your immediate close front!
The large mortar weapon pit the Advisors were occupying was of sturdy construction and larger in height and general dimensions, than normal for the NVA. In the rear of the weapon pit, in the sleeping areas, we found Chinese coins, Chinese paper money and Chinese magazines and papers, in good readable condition, if only we could read Chinese! Additionally we found NVA Dong equivalent to the SVN Piaster paper money, indicating that the previous occupants had Di Di Mau in quick time from the position, leaving behind a lot of personal material. I guess this was a strong indication that there were Chinese Advisors amongst the NVA elements, either that or we had some educated NVN military, who could read Chinese newspapers and physically used their currency? I never actually saw any Chinese soldiers on the ground however.

First Morning ( 30 MAY 70 )
We spent an uneasy night with regular NVA mortaring of both positions and HMG fire onto the northern slopes of both locations. The NVA mortars were so close we could hear the primaries going off and the CO would utter in his French accented English pronunciation, “Into ze ole Dai Uy” (Into the hole Capt), and of course by then I was already in my hole without his prompting, and with my hard hat firmly placed on my noggin, my webbing on and weapon at the ready, just like field training at OCS had taught us!
It was no coincidence that on this operation the entire Bn had been issued with gas masks, prior to our departure by CH-53. Apparently a Marine Bn had been in the area a little time before and had encounted the NVA using their mortars to lob an unknown gas agent, most likely CS Gas, onto the Marine positions. To counter such enemy activity we had quickly been issued, via the ARVN re-supply system brand new gas masks. The masks were a pain to carry, and were attached to our large back packs for ease of quick access, where they bounced and jiggled around and got tangled with all sorts of vegetation in close country.
Around an hour before first light the forward northern elements of the Bn via their listening posts, reported large enemy movement to the north and north west of both our two Rifle Coy positions. We immediately fired our Arty DF into likely FUP and AA places, and the Bn stood to expecting we knew not what! We had our FAC on station, thanks to an astute Lt Col Bacon at Team 1 Advisory HQ on Hill 55 and that was some consolation at least at that quite early time in the morning!
The NVA mortar fire became very heavy and intense around first light and began to walk across our forward defensive positions. This was not a good sign! The mortar fire moved past us altogether and suddenly all hell broke loose on both our Bn positions. The NVA had indeed been forming up and were attacking both our two Rifle Coy positions simultaneously, blowing whistles, trumpets and bugles, and coming from a general north and north westerly direction, whilst simultaneously walking in behind their mortar barrage, which had recommenced and which crept forward and moved right over our positions on both features of Tho Thenon.
Their front assaulting ranks could be clearly seen and were within 50 to 60 meters of our forward Pl, quite a disturbing sight first up in the morning before breakfast, hot coffee, a durry and a shave could be had! Not only that as within 50 meters to the rear of the assaulting NVA formation, there was another NVA assault line following up! The USMC FO quickly brought his 8 inch Arty fire down to within 60 to 70 meters of our forward elements, danger very, very close in our parlance! The NVA persisted and their attacking ranks went to ground in the safe area between our forward elements and the distance out that the FO could safely bring his Arty fire to bear on them. They obviously knew their stuff!
Fortuitously Lt Frank Ramsey had Alley Cats nearby and they were quickly on station laying down 2.75 mm HE rockets and mini guns onto the now exposed stationary and prone NVA forward attacking troops, once the Arty had checked fire. The noise was devastating and once the choppers had done their thing we recommenced firing the USMC 8 inch Arty, in an endeavour to further wreck havoc amongst the now rapidly withdrawing NVA troops. We had held and withstood the early morning NVA mass assault onto our two separate Bn locations.
We began to clean up the immediate frontal area of the Bn HQ forward pits and remove the many NVA bodies lying there. On one particular NVA soldier we found a small badge pinned to his shirt, which had notated around the top and bottom circumference the words “Xuan 1954 and Chien Si Dien Bien Phu”. Translated to English the words meant “Year 1954 and Soldier of Dien Bien Phu”. He may have survived the battle of Dien Bien Phu against the French, but he certainly had not survived his encounter with us and was now somewhere in the big PX in the Sky, thanks to the 1/51st ARVN Bn and its Advisors.
It now became very hairy to go onto the LZ or the area immediately around it, as it was under direct observation by the NVA from their higher ridge line south west of the 1487 Ba Na feature. Dustoff and re-supply choppers bought an immediate response from the NVA, who would let loose with mortar fire and HMG once they detected movement on the LZ in preparation for incoming aircraft or saw or heard the choppers approaching.
Within three to four hours the NVA had reformed and again put in frontal assaults onto our positions accompanied by whistles and bugles and the inevitable walking through of their mortar barrage, once again across our defensive positions. This time we had Phantom F-4’s on standby and Lt Frank Ramsey accurately placed his WP and brought the Nape and Snake from the F-4’s, accurately and devastatingly across our frontal positions from north east to south west and around fifty to seventy meters in front of our dug in positions. This was really quite terrifying, with the Nape being so close to our forward weapon pit positions, pity the poor Binh Si located there!
The noise was truly deafening due to the danger very close proximity of the exploding bombs and napalm, and the detonation of the NVA mortars onto our location, amidst all the enemy and friendly SA fire coming and going. Superimposed on this din was the massive explosions of the 8 inch Arty detonations, immediately forward of our frontal defensive positions. Throughout the whole of the second day on the two features the NVA put in two more concentrated Regt size attacks onto both features simultaneously. We counterpunched each time using mostly F-4 Phantoms with Nape and Snake, and the ever reliable USMC 8 inch and 155 mm heavy Arty together with gunships from the Alley Cats.
By this time I had no doubts about the size of the NVA unit we were opposed to and was thinking along the lines of Australian Army teachings, in that you would not normally attack an enemy Bn with any thing less than a Regt or Bde sized formation, considerably reinforced! At this stage I believed we were opposed to an NVA Regt plus, of at least three NVA Bn strength, considerably reinforced and supplemented with HMG and additional mortar firepower from an NVA Div. The enemy mortar fire directed onto our positions was identified as being both 82 mm and the heavier and more deadly 120mm mortar, on their two-wheeled framework.
From the appearance of the bunkers, mortar pits and weapon pits we now occupied I would not be surprised to find that the NVA Regt also had a Spr Bn under command. The larger bunkers were well constructed with timber, roughly milled, but eminently suitable for their purpose, good overhead protection, and sand bagging in all the mortar and weapon pits. This, added to the fact that the Bn CP and Advisors now in the deserted NVA HQ bunkers, were also very heavily constructed with good overhead protection and made for the long term, rather than the short term in mind! Perhaps the withdrawing NVA units were about to be replaced by fresh troops from across the border and were in fact carrying out a relief in place, with another large fresh NVA formation, when we gate-crashed their party? I really did not know!

Stinger Attack-Night Two
The second night on the positions proved to be as bad as the first night and more so. After enduring major attacks during the day I imagined the NVA would regroup, carry out a re-supply, lick their wounds and wait until the following day to resume their very aggressive attacks onto our positions. Not so, and around 2000 HR that night another large attack was mounted by the NVA together with the usual heavy mortar barrage, whistles and bugles and the corresponding rapid return of SA fire from the ARVN Bn defenders and our prepared Arty DF.
The USMC 8 inch Arty guns were to our south west and to lay down fire onto the NVA, and any likely AA and FUP, we had to fire these large calibre Arty guns directly over our Bn HQ position and over the two western Rifle Coy positions. The whooshing and swishing sound overhead and then the impact of the 8 inch shells to our immediate front, sounded like a fast express train going directly overhead followed by the huge detonation, practically in our forward pits! It was indeed fortunate that we were all so well dug in with overhead protection, courtesy of the previous NVA defenders. Compared to the ARVN 105 mm Arty, the 8 inch USMC Arty was similar to comparing a pop gun to a shotgun, with the end results on the ground being of similar proportions! We were on the extreme range limit, 10000 to 11000 meters, of the ARVN 105mm Arty and much preferred to use the USMC Arty, for obvious reasons!
Our FAC had refuelled and returned to our location and he now had on station Stinger 20, a ground attack aircraft I had not used up until this time. The Stinger, an AC-119K fixed wing gunship, had VHF secure radio on board and flew out of Phan Rang airfield in II Corps to the south, where its parent USAF unit, 14 SOW, was based. Lt Frank Ramsey had already briefed the Stinger 20 commander on our dispositions, and he now wanted us to mark with strobe lights, our four Rifle Coy locations to see exactly where we were on the ground, in relation to his intended anti-clockwise orbit.
Our first priority were the NVA, who were again attacking in extended lines, our forward defensive positions. Using flares the Stinger quickly identified the attacking NVA and begun to lay down 7.62 mm and 20 mm MG fire amongst the enemy, from somewhere around 2,500 feet altitude, lighting up the sky with flares and red tracer, and catching them some seventy to eighty meters in front of our northern defensive positions, still standing prior to going to ground, hiding or attempting to withdraw. Through the USMC FO we had already ordered check fire to the USMC Arty, whilst the Stinger was on station, and we were now relying solely on his air to ground fire support, in attempting to halt, and then rout the massed NVA soldiers attacking us.
The NVA attack came to a complete halt with Stinger 20 completing his second and third anti-clockwise circuit of the ground, on the northern approaches to our positions. More flares lit up the northern approaches and we could see NVA soldiers desperately trying to get back to their start lines and into heavier dead ground vegetation, in an attempt to escape the Stinger’s withering fire. Within ten to fifteen minutes the NVA had disappeared and we could now get on with identifying our exact locations to Stinger 20.
We had previously prepared special steel helmets, painted white on the inside of the outer lid, and it was simply a matter of placing the switched on strobe light inside the outer helmet, and then securing the helmet in the fork of a tree, making sure the strobe flash was directed up into the night sky immediately above the tree. The four Coy size positions, on and around the Tho Thenon feature managed to get their strobes going and I waited for the Stinger aircraft commander to get back to me, and confirm our four locations. So far so good!
Within minutes the Stinger had identified seven locations with strobes flashing, and I realised immediately that the NVA had been monitoring our VHF frequencies and had used this to their advantage. I immediately got onto Lt Frank Ramsey, and using the Whiz Wheel, again gave him the GR of our four Coy defensive positions. He then spoke to the Stinger in clear, on the HF or UHF frequency and relayed again our GR to the aircraft. From ensuing conversations with Frank, the aircraft and the Bn CO, we were able to determine that the three most northern strobes were indeed NVA initiated strobes, and after again talking to the CO, I gave the go ahead for Stinger 20 to plaster them with his very impressive range of deadly automatic heavy calibre firepower.
Around midday on the second day we received a heavy NVA mortar barrage mainly onto the LZ and Bn HQ area. The Marine Lt had been sitting on the edge of my weapon pit, with his legs dangling over the side talking to Lt Mike Boyer, when the first rounds began to explode in the tree tops. He was intending to make a dignified return to his pit and about to stand up when he gave a loud shout of pain.
Lt Mike Boyer and I had already taken refuge in our weapon pit when a large shower of blood from the leg of the Lt, sprayed over us and the Lt collapsed into our pit along side of us! He had taken a large piece of shrapnel in his right thigh and was bleeding profusely! We quickly stemmed the flow of blood with our field dressings and bandages, and propped up the unfortunate Marine Offr in the corner of the pit. He was very lucky as the shrapnel had not severed any main artery in the upper thigh area of his leg! We now had the double problem of getting him quickly back to Danang via Dustoff, and we now no longer had a Marine Offr with our USMC FO party.
A USMC Huey Dustoff chopper quickly arrived, we popped Mellow Yellow smoke and in they came together with the usual intense NVA mortar and MG fire onto the Bn HQ and LZ location. As quickly as humanly possible the USMC Lt was loaded on board and the Huey quickly rose slightly, nosed down, and sped off the LZ to the southeast gathering air speed as it rose. The USMC Arty support FO party now consisted of an NCO and his two radio operators. The NCO came over to see me once the Marine chopper had departed and the NVA mortar fire had diminished.
I knew that in accordance with USMC SOP in regard to USMC Arty Fire support, their fire request procedure required the initials of an Offr, as part of the radio dialogue and authentication of the fire mission being requested. To this end as long as Lt Mike Boyer (Mike Bravo) or myself (Bravo Mike Charlie Golf ) were on hand at all times we would still get our much needed Arty Fire support from the USMC guns, via these phonetic Offr names. Which particular Army the Offr initials came from was not all that important, as long as it was a “round eye” Offr! I’m not too sure how an ARVN Offr would go though requesting a fire mission! To this end the three remaining Marines moved along side our bunker system and the NCO accompanied me, whenever we attended the CO O Gp or the CO came to our bunker with fire requests of an urgent and immediate nature.

Third Morning ( 31 MAY 70 )
On the third morning, day three of the operation, the CO decided to take the initiative and push his reserve Rifle Coy through the 1235 feature and down into the valley to the west, more as a Recce in Force element than as a deliberate ploy to obtain and hold more ground in that direction. The Rifle Coy moved out around 0800 HR that morning, as we had had no contact since 2000 HR the previous night. The Rifle Coy made good progress down the spur line and into the valley proper where they were immediately ambushed by a vastly superior NVA force dug in on sloping ground well east of the 1227 Bang Yaung feature and the Song Yang . The NVA were dug in, in the shape of a very large rectangular U, with the ARVN Rifle Coy walking straight into the open side from the east! With the aid of our FAC, and more Alley Cats, the Rifle Coy managed to carry out a fighting rut lui but suffered heavy losses getting back onto the 1235 feature. They had sustained some fifty seven (57) KIA, a further twenty eight (28) WIA and around twenty (20) MIA, quite substantial Rifle Coy Binh Si losses in the ambush which lasted well over forty minutes in duration.
As they struggled back to their original defensive position the CO was visibly affected, he was actually sobbing and crying as he knew some of the ARVN KIA extremely well, and requested the use of my secure radio set which had excellent communications with Hill 55, to speak to his Regt commander, Col Thuc. The secure “green” AN-PRC 77 set had good communications thanks to a VHF retransmission facility provided by the USMC between Thuong Duc and Hill 55. He spoke to the Regt commander, for some ten to fifteen minutes and explained the situation we were in, surrounded by a vastly numerically superior NVA force, wherein we could neither go forward nor withdraw, without being severely mauled by the large NVA element, whilst so doing.
I spoke to Lt Col Bacon immediately the CO had finished, and he advised we were indeed opposed by a NVA Regt (+) of the usual three Bn, which had been reinforced by an additional NVA Bn! What we were to discover later was that a further NVA Bn had indeed joined the original four Bn on day two of the operation, thereby making life most uncomfortable and very unpleasant for the Advisors and Binh Si of 1/51st ARVN Bn. We were now being opposed by an estimated reinforced NVA Regt (+) of some five NVA Bn plus supporting troops and outnumbered nearly five to one!
From a US DOD intelligence report dated 03 FEB 96 it is highly likely that the NVA Inf Regt we were facing was the 38th NVA Regt of the 324th Inf Div from the 44th NVA Front. This particular Regt was originally the 3rd NVA Regt and was redesignated the 60th NVA Regt in FEB 69. In JAN 70 the 60th NVA Regt was again redesignated, and became the 38th NVA Regt! Importantly the 38th NVA Regt had under command the 8th Sapper Bn, which fits our scenario to a tee. During APR 70 the 38th NVA Regt was tasked to prevent reinforcements arriving at Thuong Duc, which was under attack from the 8th Sapper Bn, and for two weeks had heavy contact with the 2/51st and 4/51st ARVN Bn, our sister Bn from the 51st ARVN Regt. The 38th NVA Regt withdrew into the hills, to regroup after these enagements, and was to make contact with the 1/51st ARVN Bn some 3 to 4 weeks later.

Fourth Morning ( 01 Jun 70 )
The NVA launched another large assault onto our position around 0700 HR on Day 4 of the operation. With the aid of more Phantoms and Gun Ships we managed to again hold our positions and the NVA again withdrew to lick their wounds and regroup. By Day 4 the Advisors had put in some seventy eight (78) sorties of Phantoms, two ( 2 ) Stingers all night for three nights, Alley Cats in the vicinity of forty (40) plus sorties, and huge amounts of heavy Arty rounds of the 8 inch, 175 mm and 155 mm variety! Additionally our FAC had been arriving early in the mornings and only departing late in the afternoon or evening when relieved, to allow for the next days activities and refueling and re-arming.

It was around this time that I came across one of the most venomous and most common snakes of northern SVN, the bamboo viper. My batman, Binh Si Lee had been rearranging our defensive and sleeping areas by cutting down vegetation to provide more shade during the daylight hours adjacent to our weapon pits. He suddenly let out a yell and began to hack the vines, which were hanging down out of one particular tree, with his machete. These vines were directly above our main weapon pit in which I had been standing and talking to Lt Boyer. What he had actually discovered was a bamboo viper, which had been moving down the vines and into our little area. Luckily one of his first machete strikes had be-headed the serpent. The bamboo viper is coloured a bright green, a very skinny snake and no more than three to four foot in length, and very hard to pick out amongst the vines and greenery that grow in dense jungle. One of us may have been bitten except for the diligence and keen eye sight of Binh Si Lee.

Withdrawal on Fifth Morning ( 02 JUN 70 )
Late afternoon of Day 4 and I received orders from the CO that the Bn was to rut lui and would be air lifted out from the main LZ at 0800 HR the following morning, once again using USMC CH-53 choppers. I quickly spoke to Lt Col Bacon and he advised there was an Arc Light planned to go in on all high features to the north and west of our positions and onto our very own positions, on WED/THU 3/4 JUN 70. I hoped to be well clear, thank you, of the two Tho Thenon features we were now occupying, by 1200 HR TUE 2 JUN 70 thanks to the USMC choppers. The time to rut lui or buggar out came and strangely the NVA mortar and MG fire had diminished somewhat during the last ten hours on the features, except for spasmodic mortar shelling and the firing of 12.7 mm HMG onto our forward weapon pit positions. I did not know whether this was a good or bad sign! The plan was for the two western Rifle Coy to move back to our main HQ position just after stand down that morning when the Alley Cats would once again lay down suppressive fire onto the 1235 feature, that the two Rifle Coy were departing from. These two Rifle Coy would then be the first two Rifle Coy onto the choppers and back to Hill 55.
Concurrently the reserve Rifle Coy that had taken the heavy casualities, had been moved into a blocking position on the western approach to the 1210 feature. This was intended to thwart any NVA follow up of the withdrawing ARVN from the 1235 feature. All went well and the choppers quickly landed and took off again with the two western ARVN Rifle Coy on board three sorties of USMC CH-53 choppers. By now the NVA were well aware of our withdrawal intentions and opened up with heavy mortar and HMG fire onto the Bn HQ position. We had to await the return of the choppers, sit in our bunkers and fire our pre- planned DF for the withdrawal, in between gunship and Phantom strikes.
This was all being co-ordinated by the FAC following our instructions from the ground. In theory we needed a further eight CH-53 lifts to get the remaining Rifle Coy, Bn HQ Coy and the Prisoner Coy together with the USMC FO party and the Advisors in one foul swoop! Dai Uy Thanh and myself had already been picked up by a Marine C & C Huey, and we were busily watching the third and fourth lift taking place from the port side of the chopper. We had good communications with the FAC and the Alley Cats, who were doing an excellent job of keeping the NVA from quickly following up our ARVN soldiers from the west.
Lt Mike Boyer and Sgt Willie Fuller leapt on board the first CH-53 that landed for the third lift, along with other members of Bn HQ. The Reserve Rifle Coy followed shortly in the fourth lift and all that remained on the LZ itself were the dreaded ARVN RSM and two Pl of the Bn HQ Coy! Time was of the essence and the NVA were attempting to get back onto the LZ feature, defended now by a depleted ARVN Rifle Coy! The FAC continued to lay down F-4 Nape and Snake and Alley Cat HE rocket and mini gun fire, to deter them in no uncertain terms. Quite soon the last two CH-53 returned and it quickly picked up the remaining ARVN Coy (-) from the LZ, in record loading time and both took off successfully. All had gone well even with the NVA in close hot pursuit!
We had carried out the withdrawal under fire and taken no serious casualities whilst so doing. The pre-planned DF onto our original positions was then fired as we moved further to the east and back to Hill 55. The FAC reported the NVA had indeed been quickly following us up and had been caught out moving onto our recently abandoned features, by the large concentration of USMC Arty and Gunship fire.

(h)
During the last week of this operation, 10-17 JUL 70, a number of extraordinary events occurred. As we advanced further and further to the north and north east a couple of the Binh Si belonging to the Prisoner Coy decided to do a runner. I guess they thought that as NVA contacts had been few and far between of late they would be on to a good thing, and escape from their menial and physically demanding ARVN Bn punishment. Unarmed and with neither compass nor map, they disappeared one night and we presumed they would have headed back to the south southeast in a direction and an area, which the Bn had already advanced through and would most likely be devoid of NVA soldiers. I guess the adage “who can fathom or ever attempt to understand the Asian mind” has a good deal of truth to it! They disappeared completely and we carried on with our advance to the north. Two mornings later, as we again moved along the high ground to the northeast with the two leading Rifle Coy clearing the ridge line on either side, and Bn HQ Coy and the remaining Rifle Coy having an easy time on the high ground, we came across a terrible sight.
Immediately to our front and on the track itself were two stakes about four foot high, with a human head impaled on each. We had found our AWOL Binh Si from two days earlier! They had not headed over safe ground but instead had moved to our north and paid the supreme penalty. Their heads had apparently been macheted and hacked from their bodies, and placed on the track as a warning to the rest of us! By their facial expressions they had suffered very painful and excruciating deaths. The CO very quickly arranged the removal and burial of the remains of the two Binh Si, probably to prevent too many other Binh Si from seeing the fate of their comrades-in-arms. I guess the remainder of the Prisoner Coy would have taken particular urgent note of the fortunes of their mates, and escape now would have been the furtherest thing on their minds, for very good reasons I might add!

(i)
On the morning of WED 22 JUL 70 the Bn was moved by US Army Huey choppers to a FUP some 10 clicks to the west of the north south railway line where it bisects Route 4. The move was quite uneventful and by 1100 HR the Bn was ready to commence its latest operation. The 1/51st ARVN Bn began actively patrolling our AO from west to east. Using the north south joining portion of the Song Thu Bon and Song La Tho Rivers as our SL we moved to the immediate east in a two Rifle Coy up formation. Bn HQ was centrally located behind the leading two Rifle Coy, and the remaining Rifle Coy with the prisoner Coy following up Bn HQ, a typical ARVN formation for moving in flat, paddy field country. This formation gave us a wide coverage to the front and flanks, good firepower all round and the Bn CO had two reserve Coy size elements, one being his HQ Coy, to deploy if and when we made contact with any large enemy formation.
The two leading ARVN Rifle Coy were doing all the hard yakka and being harassed by individual enemy snipers, who went to ground once contact had been made and the respective ARVN Rifle Coy began to deploy. Progress was necessarily slow and towards mid afternoon as we approached the meandering Song Ky Lam, the leading elements began to come across booby traps and NVA/VC laid mines concealed on approaches to the river banks and crossing points.
Dai Uy Thanh decided to go into a Bn harbour earlier than usual, to enable Dustoff and Black Cat choppers in to evacuate the wounded and bring in much needed water and ammunition after our days activities. We had already had two ( 2 ) ARVN KIA by M-16 mines and booby traps and a further five ( 5 ) WIA who needed to return to Danang for further medical treatment. It was really hard going in the heat and humidity and the ever present harassing NVA/VC snipers, mines and booby traps.
Next morning the Bn again moved to the east and for the next three days suffered continual NVA/VC sniper fire from the densely foliaged banks of the Song Thu Bon and Song Ky Lam river systems. The Rifle Coy Pl deployed, attacked the enemy sniper positions and generally found nothing at all, the enemy soldiers simply disappearing underground into their well hidden underground complexes.
On the morning of 28 JUL 70 the Bn was advancing across open paddy fields approaching a larger than usual hamlet. One of the lead Pl commanders was waving his battle map wildy, whilst directing his Binh Si onto the magnetic bearing of advance that he wanted. A single AK-47 shot was heard and the unfortunate Lt hit the rice field ground dead, shot through the neck by a NVA sniper, holed up in the village we were slowly approaching.
Dai Uy Thanh was livid and immediately surrounded the village with the complete Bn and the HQ Coy went in to investigate and search the huts and associated out-houses and barns. The total population of the village, probably some forty to fifty residents including children, were now assembled in the open central area of the hamlet and the CO and his Int Offr began their interrogation of the now quite frightened and bewildered peasants. Of note was the fact the village’s occupants, that we had just rounded up, consisted solely of old men and women and very young children only! There were no males or females in the age groups of sixteen to fifty, necessary for the production of the young children that we were now looking at! I assumed the missing parents, and any SVN Army age males, were all either tending the paddy fields elsewhere or were all enemy sympathizers, and had all gone underground, along with the enemy sniper.
The CO singled out the village Chief, a very old skinny Vietnamese with the usual distinguished long grey beard about two foot in length, and was having an animated conversation with him, waving his pace stick threateningly and becoming more and more agitated by the minute. He suddenly exploded and began to beat the old man around the head and shoulders until he finally fell to the ground, under the sustained physical attack of the CO and his French Army baton.
All Vietnamese villages have extensive bunker systems under all the occupied living huts. This was primarily for protection at night from friendly Arty and Mortar H & I missions and also during the day from errant friendly ground attack aircraft, which may or may not be on target. More importantly it enabled small groups of NVA/VC enemy to simply vanish underground and return later to carry out their destructive missions when the ARVN Forces had left the area.
Dai Uy Thanh was obviously quite upset at losing the young Lt to the enemy sniper and knew very well that the culprit was in hiding in one of the various hidden bunker systems within the village proper. He issued curt orders and immediately the reserve Rifle Coy went from hut to hut setting fire to the thatched roofs of all the huts, and lobbing grenades into each and every bunker under each individual hut. This had the effect of collapsing each hut into its own bunker system, whilst still burning furiously and wiping out the ground level hut itself. Quiet soon two or three secondary explosions occurred, which indicated arms, ammunition and explosives had been hidden in certain huts, which were all now burning furiously! The CO went up another mental cog upon seeing and hearing these secondary detonations and stormed back to his mobile Bn CP and the Advisors.
Upon seeing the destruction of their homes the young Vietnamese, still huddled together under the watchful eyes of the HQ Coy Binh Si, began to cry and wail. This only served to make the CO even more furious and he ordered certain soldiers to go in and shut them up. They did this in no uncertain terms using the butts of their M-16 rifles on the older Vietnamese who by this time were also moaning, crying and groaning. The end result was that within five minutes all the noise had stopped. The majority of the adults were beaten to the ground, along with some of the children, and they now sat, bloody and huddled on the ground watching the destruction of their village. They understood now to remain quiet or suffer the wrath of the CO, and his Bn of Binh Si from the 51st ARVN Regt.
As Senior Advisor and as a foreigner, I really could not interfere in this matter, as it was a matter between the South Vietnamese Military (ARVN), and the local Vietnamese peasants and we three Advisors simply watched from a discreet distance, the activities going on between fellow indigenous Vietnamese. It was really a matter of whom the villagers feared the most, the ARVN or the NVA/VC! I reported the matter latter to Regt HQ knowing full well little, if anything, would be done via the US Army Advisory system!
As we moved out without finding any trace of the sniper, I thought to myself not a very appropriate method to win the hearts and minds of this particular village, but after all one of our ARVN Offr had been KIA. Then again the NVA/VC adapt exactly the same methods of terror, by executing and then exhibiting the bodies of non co-operative village chiefs, teachers, doctors, nurses and those with an education or were elders, until they simply found more co-operative village chiefs, teachers, doctors, nurses and elders to further their cause! The NVA/VC go by the proven old military and political adage that if you “grab the villagers by their balls, then their hearts and minds will surely follow”, a too true fact dependent on who is dominant in the particular area at the time, and who is actually doing the ball grabbing! This was the NVA/VC in effect using the WHAM system against ourselves, with great effect I might add!

(i)
(11 August 1970)
After insertion by US Army CH-47 into an area south of the Song La Tho where it crosses Route 4 the Bn advanced to the north and went into an early Bn harbour on the southern approaches to the highway running from the west to the east. It was mid afternoon and we had not made contact with any enemy units. The CO and I discussed our night DF locations, and after registration with the USMC Arty on Hill 55, the Bn settled into its night time routine. It was a balmy hot night but thankfully without rain and good night observation due to excellent moon conditions and little cloud cover.
Early morning and the Bn stood to prior to getting ready to move out and after having an early breakfast. There was a small dirt road running along the eastern perimeter of Bn HQ which intersected at right angles with Route 4 to our north, and carried on past the main road and in the general direction of the Song La Tho River to the far north. The HQ Coy was harboured in the area bounded by the two roads, which met at right angles to our north and east, and we had large open expanses of flat ground to our immediate south and west across the paddy fields.
Stand down was ordered, however within five minutes we again stood to as one of the more astute Binh Si had discovered numerous M-14 anti-personnel mines scattered on the ground around the north eastern perimeter of the Bn CP and the Advisory HQ area. The CO called for all Advisors and Bn HQ staff to remain in their present locations whilst his anti-mine Squad cleared and deloused the whole Bn HQ area. In all nine M-14 anti-personnel mines, laid straight onto the ground, in no particular laying pattern and without camouflage, were discovered and removed. The mines had obviously been laid during the night and in such a haphazard manner that upon discovery during daylight, they were easy to spot and dispose of.
I had long suspected that amongst the Binh Si in the Bn there were numerous NVA/VC enemy agents or NVA/VC sympathisers and this confirmed my latent suspicions. On a much earlier operation we had a contact rear which is most unusual, and which had lasted all of three to four minutes. Upon investigation and the Rifle Coy reporting in, the CO advised me that we had two ( 2 ) Binh Si KIA, who came from the western Rifle Coy on our left flank. No enemy had been sighted that I was aware of, no enemy weapon particularly AK-47 shooting heard, and no follow up or pursuit of any NVA/VC snipers took place. It was all very, very strange!
I thought at the time it was all a very odd and an unusual type contact. I realised much later the two dead ARVN who were shot from behind, were more than likely enemy infiltrators whom the CO and his Int Squad had ferreted out and identified, and they had most likely been disposed of in a ARVN manner. I guess handling the matter on operation was the most sensible thing to do by the CO and his most trusted, reliable Int Hit-Squad people!
After the M-14 mines had been cleared we again headed in a northerly direction, over Route 4 and towards the Song La Tho. We again harboured quite early and the CO held an O Gp to issue orders for the following day. He was obviously still concerned about the laying of the M-14 mines within Bn HQ during the night, and gave detailed orders on where the Bn would commence the next days activities and the exact location of the three Rifle Coy, and HQ Coy, prior to crossing the SL and advancing to contact.
The SL in fact was another north south running dirt road which ran back to the south and met with Route 4, about two clicks to the east of the previous dirt road running from the south into Route 4, where we had harboured the previous evening. Once across the SL we would be approaching an old quite large Vietnamese come Chinese cemetery, with many large head stones and which was clearly marked on our maps, four clicks to the east.
There was a large hamlet to the immediate north of the cemetery three clicks distant. The main entrance to the cemetery faced back to the west, where several small tracks led into the cemetery proper, from the main dirt road which was our SL. To the immediate north and north west of the cemetery was a large swampy area with large expanses of deep water and a plentiful cover of mangroves and reeds, leading into the Song La Tho itself.
On the planned axis of advance to the east, the two lead Rifle Coy would pass to the north and south of the cemetery, about one click distant, and the HQ Coy and Reserve Coy would on our planned axis of advance, pass right through the cemetery proper.
Next morning we were preparing to move to our FUP and then move across the SL at H HR, and in the general direction of the cemetery to the east. The CO issued hurried new orders for the Bn, and the whole Bn immediately moved quickly back to our previous NDP south of Route 4. From there, and using the height of Route 4 above the paddy fields, to partially screen our movement to the east, we proceeded east for approximately four clicks and then crossed over Route 4 and advanced in a northerly direction directly towards the location of the cemetery, and to the west and east of it.
The CO had in fact changed the Bn axis of advance by ninety degrees, or 1600 mils to Aussi Diggers, and we were now approaching the cemetery from the south and not from the west as we had earlier planned. It was just as well and quite fortuitous on the part of the Bn CO to change the axis of advance of the Bn! Maybe he knew something that I was not aware of? He was certainly most correct, professional and proper in his change of plan from what was quickly about to eventuate.
The lead Rifle Coy to our west came under intense HMG fire from the cemetery as soon as they began to cross the two west to east running tracks, that the Bn was originally going to use as rough guide lines on our axis of advance. They immediately went to ground and returned fire but were pinned down by the extraordinary large amount of HMG firepower coming from the cemetery. Due to the number of enemy HMG and RPG and the volume of SA fire we immediately assumed there was at least a NVA Coy ( + ), including reinforcement HMG dug in around the cemetery complex.
The second Rifle Coy to our east was too far away to have any influence on this sudden large contact with the NVA, who had in addition to their normal 7.62 mm RPD LMG complement, two or three 12.7 mm HMG with arcs of fire to the west, covering our western Rifle Coy.
The Bn Comd decided to put in a quick or immediate frontal attack, my very first, straight onto the NVA position in the cemetery with his HQ Coy, a la “up the guts with plenty of smoke”! We proceeded at a quick rate straight onto the enemy position from the south, with two Rifle Pl up, Bn HQ in a central position between the two lead Rifle Pl, and the remainder of HQ Coy behind the now very mobile Bn CP and its Advisors.
We were immediately met with concentrated enemy 7.62 mm MG, from at least two RPD LMG and SA fire but maintained our momentum and direction straight onto the enemy objective. The CO had his US Army 45 cal pistol out and was directing fire by shouting and screaming, and indicating to his Binh Si by pointing and firing his pistol towards where the enemy 7.62 mm LMG were bringing fire to bear on us. It was fairly hairy with enemy MG, RPG and SA fire whistling and buzzing past our ears, and the CO and his Bn HQ group ignoring the enemy fire and continuing their assault. The Advisors remained with Bn HQ, as we had no other choice really and it all happened too fast, and joined in with the mad assault of the 1/51st ARVN Bn HQ, Binh Si!
Our FAC was on station and indicated a small element of NVA, probably of Pl ( + ) strength, had begun to withdrawn quickly from the cemetery position and gone into hiding in the heavy marshes and water area to the north west of the cemetery site. He had Alley Cats on station in no time at all and they quickly attacked the NVA fleeing into the swamps and verges of the Song La Tho.
The NVA position was well dug in and it was a matter of taking out each weapon pit as we came across them. The Binh Si were using their M-79, M-72 and grenades to maximum advantage on individual weapon pits, and we quickly moved into the cemetery proper. The NVA position was well sited with the majority of weapon pits and HMG facing the west, the direction we would have advanced from except for the CO changing his battle plan at the last moment. We rapidly overran the NVA position and quickly went to ground in all round defence expecting an NVA counter attack at any moment.
Our eastern Rifle Coy moved into a position to our south east as a ready reserve, and the western Rifle Coy moved to a position north east of the cemetery, and able to bring direct fire to bear on the last known enemy position in the swamp. We quickly took stock of the situation. The NVA in the weapon pits in the cemetery had all been KIA and had physically lost their heads or been badly wounded in the upper torso body areas from concentrated M-79, M-72 fire and grenades, or had been taken out by M-60 and M-16 SA fire from the attacking Binh Si of HQ Coy.
The CO directed a Reserve Pl from the Reserve Coy, to get immediately onto the trail of the NVA who had fled into the swamps leading into the Song La Tho. They did not get far into the swamp when two or three NVA popped up out of the water and reeds, and after firing three to four shots disappeared again. They obviously had prepared hides within the swamp and were making life quite dangerous for the ARVN, who were floundering around in quite deep water with all their combat gear on their backs, and carrying their M-16 Rifles at Present Arms height, whilst trying to carry out contact drills in waist high water against the NVA at the same time.
I suggested to the CO he recall his Rifle Pl and we would use Nape and Snake to flush out the hidden enemy. He readily and rapidly agreed and Lt Frank Ramsey indicated F-4, with the correct mixture of bombs and napalm, would be on station in less than five minutes. He quickly marked the swamp area where we had taken fire from the enemy with WP, I gave him immediate clearance, and we awaited the imminent arrival of the Phantoms.
The two sorties arrived and after being briefed by the FAC quickly dropped their deadly cargo of napalm and HE bombs in a north east to south west pattern, across the Bn front.
It was becoming like a fun day at Flemington Race Course, with the Binh Si standing up and clapping and cheering on the high ground overlooking the swamp area, as the USAF Phantoms went about their deadly business. One of the Napalm canisters deflected in our general direction and landed no more than fifteen meters to our immediate front starting a scrub fire, and causing the Binh Si to scatter and quickly take cover again. The ordnance dropped quickly engulfed a large area of swamp and marshes, which burnt furiously to our immediate front and slowly began to burn itself out.
No sooner had the FGA aircraft departed than Lt Frank Ramsey reported at least eight to ten blackened and badly burnt NVA bodies lying in the water in the heavy reed areas. The original Rifle Pl was sent to retrieve the bodies, which in fact now totaled thirteen (13) NVA KIA, and they dragged the unfortunate enemy soldiers and their weapons and gear back to the shallows on the edge of the swamp.
The napalm had done its job only too well. The NVA had been using some sort of hollow bamboo or reeds to breathe through the water in their hides, and when the napalm had hit their immediate area they would not have been able to breathe, would had been forced to surface, and were then immediately engulfed in the burning napalm. Those that somehow survived the Nape, had then been blown away by the quickly following Snape HE high drag bombs. The bodies were not a pretty sight after the Nape and Snake had done its work to send them to a watery grave. They looked like large over-cooked huge black beef sausages, with black crusty outsides!

(i)
22 AUG 70 - 13 SEP 70
HAPPY VALLEY & CHARLIE RIDGE AO

This operation was to be my last with the 1/51st ARVN Bn and was conducted in the AO areas named by the USMC as Happy Valley and Charlie Ridge. Charlie Ridge was a large high ground area some 8 clicks due west of Hill 55. It was a well known NVA/VC transit area, and was used to transport 122 mm rockets and 82 mm mortars to within range of the sprawling Danang AFB on the south western outskirts of Danang, and the city itself.
To the immediate west of Charlie Ridge was another area known as Happy Valley, leading up into the mountains proper, and this was actually the area in and around the Song Suoi Ca Valley. It was also an NVA/VC stronghold and was named after the river, which ran the entire length of the valley. It was not so named because it was a happy place or area wherin USMC soldiers could do drugs, but rather a play on words as it was far from a happy hunting place for the USMC, during earlier operations the previous five years.
Happy Valley was the commencement of the large mountain chain running right through to the far west of Quang Nam Province, and eventually to the area north of Thuong Duc, where we had conducted operations during MAY/JUN 70. It was a strong NVA/VC area and to my knowledge, had lately not been patrolled regularly or had operations conducted in on a regular basis during early 1970. It was part of the NVA/VC resupply route for their forces in Quang Nam Province, particularly those around Danang and the AFB itself.
The Bn was air lifted to an area on the southern approaches to Charlie Ridge by USMC CH-53 on the morning of SAT 22 AUG 70. Without any dramas the Bn was complete on the ground by 1000 HR and we began to climb the gradual slopes to the heights of Charlie Ridge, to enable us to move along the high ground in a north, north westerly direction.
All was quiet and although we had no contact with the enemy we found signs of their occupation and movement through the area. Old harbour locations, cooking fires and unfilled shallow weapon pits were discovered in two locations. They had not been used for some time and most indications of recent foot movement were in a west and north west direction, back towards Happy Valley and the high country to its immediate west.
After four days of advancing to the west we had little to show for our endeavours and the CO issued new orders for our movement through Happy Valley and into the mountains proper. In this part of the AO we were sure to encounter some enemy units.
Day seven and the Bn was moving to the top of a particularly high feature. The two leading Rifle Coy had already made the high ground and were clearing the northern reaches of our objective. As the Bn advanced up the southern approaches one of the lead Pl discovered a track leading into a large complex deep within the mountain itself, from the southern side. The CO immediately directed the most northern Rifle Coy to get a move on and secure the area where the underground complex would more than likely have a northern exit or entrance. They found the northern entrance by accident, by stumbling into contact with the rear party of a large NVA element moving quickly north, into the densely treed areas on the high ground in that direction.
A brief firefight ensued and the FAC using USMC Arty, hassled the fleeing NVA before they disappeared completely into the tree line on the next high ground. HQ Coy made its way down to the northern entrance to the NVA complex and we prepared to conduct a through search of our unexpected discovery, so very close to Danang and Hill 55. What we had stumbled on was in fact a large NVA underground hospital complex. After moving through the quite narrow and unassuming entrance tunnel, the complex expanded into a huge underground cavern. There were dozens of makeshift beds arranged along both sides of the main cavern, a cooking area come kitchen on the northern side, a stinking, smelly latrine area on the southern side, and a further area set aside for medical treatment and surgical operations, screened off from the bed complex.
Basic electrical wiring was still evident in the administration and medical theatre areas, so the NVA must have had some means of generating electricity prior to our arrival in the area, probably small man portable generators. By now all NVA soldiers and medical staff had disappeared, along with important equipment, and we were left with an empty NVA hospital complex, and empty beds, which could cater up to a hundred plus wounded NVA, with no NVA at all to be seen or heard.
The northern most Rifle Coy had been more fortunate however and had captured an NVA doctor and nurse, during their brief contact with the fleeing enemy. The two POW were quickly brought to Bn HQ where the Int Squad and the CO conducted on the spot heavy verbal interrogation of the pair. The doctor was probably in his thirties and the nurse, a rather fetching NVA female soldier probably in her early twenties! They appeared to be quite up front, were well fed and healthy, and after much conversation and note taking were escorted away by the Int Squad people attached to Bn HQ.
I advised the CO that the doctor in particular should be sent back ASAP to Regt HQ, and then Danang, for possible invaluable information he may possess, in regard to enemy units, numbers and locations in the area. The CO agreed and advised a VNAF Huey would be picking up our two POW from an area to the south of the main feature. I advised the Regt Advisory HQ of the arrangements and got on with more pressing matters.
I was to learn later the doctor only made it back to Regt HQ, with the NVA nurse strangely disappearing on or before the VNAF flight back to Hill 55. Using my imagination I did not like to think too deeply in regard to the disappearance of the NVA nurse, she was a good looking female after all, and fighting for the NVA enemy cause!